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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
This report presents the findings of the authors from their year-
long comparative study of six regional airports, at Dallas/Fort Worth,
Kansas City, Washington, D. C., Montreal, Tampa, and St. Louis. Although
differing importantly in design and capacity, each of these airports is
regional in nature. All but two are in operation -the airport at Montreal
is under construction, and plans for a new airport at St. Louis are still
a matter of local and national dispute.
An initial study of the Dallas/FortWorth Regional Airport was under-
taken by two of us over two years ago. The report on that first year's
study* reviewed the regional political, social, and economic context
in which the airport was planned, designed, constructed and opened for
operations. In the past year, we have continued to monitor that airport,
but have also sought to deepen our understanding through comparison with
experiences elsewhere.
The concept of a regional airport may be approached in several dif-
ferent ways. It may be defined in terms of size, location, area served,
the design group's intentions, or users' perceptions, to name but a few
possibilities. We have limited our definition to that relatively small
*See James Brown and J. D' Starling, Prometheu s Unbound: A S_dy of the
Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport, February 197_.
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class of facilities that, from the first, have been mandated by the
Federal Aviation Administration to serve an entire region or "economic
city". Thus the airports we are studying have been conceived as
regional facilities from the outset, by designers and policy-makers
alike. We approach each case as a unique historical entity, but go
on to investigate such common elemeuts as:
l) the use of predictive models in planning;
2) the role of symbolism to heighten dramatic effect;
3) the roles of community and professional elites; and
2) design flexibility.
These elements are singled out in each case and are then further refined
in a comparative theoretical chapter. We have in this way enriched
our propositions developed from the Dallas/Fort Worth case and have
developed more general hypotheses.
Among the more important hypotheses developed from our study thus far
are the following:
l) Selecting the site for a regional airport tends to generate
political, social and economic, as well as technical, conflicts.
2) Conflicts generated in the site-selection process may continue to
affect the design, construction and operation of the regional
airport.
3) Resolutions of site-selection controversies imposed by extra-
regional authority or reached by pre-existing regional institutions
are likely to have fewer negative carry-over effects than are
resolutions reached by ad hoc negotiations among regional interests.
I_
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4) A common route to local elites' resolution of site-selection
and planning controversies is to stress the economic growth-
generating promise of the new airport.
5) Emphasis on economic growth tends to lead the policy-makers
and the design group to stress large capacity and dramatic,
high-technology design.
6) Policy-makers and designers find that large, dramatic, high-
technology designs are very costly, a realization which commonly
leads to fumther justification and/or attempts to reduce capital
outlay.
7) The need to explain large capital outlays is likely to be filled
at the outset by projections of rapid growth.
8) Projections of accelerated demand tend to amplify the tendency
to dramatic, high-technology designs in keeping with expectations
that the facility itself will be a determinant of the predicted
acceleration.
9) Varying experience levels among both policy-makers and designers
tend to be associated with the dramatic and technical character-
istics of the resultant facility.
This comparative research has enabled us to question the assumptions
underlying present airport planning methods and design techniques.
It also should begin to lead us toward alternative perspectives regarding
airport plans and designs.
In the coming year, we expect to visit each regional airport once
again in order further to refine this beginning, somewhat rough analysis
of the highly interactive relationship between the socio-political and
technical processes in the formation of large-scale, technical projects.
w
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CHAPTER TWO
D/FW: The Second Year*
The Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport continues to be an im-
portant newsmaker. Through the second year of operation the facility
has been plagued by technical, financial, and political difficulties.
Of the many impediments that have vexed airport officials since D/FW
opened, three have been particularly important in the past year.
In our investigation of D/FW we suggested that the Airtrans
people mover system was a design feature intended as much for symbolic
as functional purpose. We argued also that it was an expensive, techni-
cally sophisticated apparatus which was contributing to costly excess
at D/FW.
We went on to say that expensive excesses resulting from invest-
ment in symbolic function led to optimistic expectations regarding
revenue/cost ratios and, as a consequence, day to day finances or cash
flow would be disappointing to administrators _and local officials alike.
Such disappointments, we concluded, might very likely rekindle old
antagonisms, and elites in Dallas and Fort Worth once again would be
fueding over commercial air service to the region. Thus, predictably,
in 1975 the three most newsworthy topics were disagreement and dis-
*For an analysis of the development and first year of operation at
D/FW see Brown and Starling, Prometheus Unbound: A Stud_ of the Dallas-
Fort Worth Regional Ai__i__, February 197_, NSG 20_6.
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appointment resulting from revenue/cost imbalances which were exacer-
bated by Airtrans' poor performance and Southwest Airlines providing
inexpensive commercial service from Dallas' Love Field.
Current Operations, Problems and Prospects
Airtrans: poor performance, litigation, and hard feelings - the
surprising costs of symbolic functions.
In our February, 1975 report, we argued that the Airtrans people
mover system appeared to have been included to serve a symbolic purpose
more than passenger needs (p. 59). We noted that while the Airtrans
system was expected to fulfill six different internal transportation
functions, only two were operating, and unreliably at that. At this
writing Airtrans still carries only passengers and supplies, though
somewhat more dependably than a year ago.
As a result of the gap between expectation and performance, the
Airport Board would not accept Airtrans from the contractor, Ling Temco
Vought, until it could reliably perform the six basic functions specified
in the contract. LTV responded by shutting down the system for ten
days in March of 1975, claiming that the Airport Board owed them an
additional fifteen million dollars for contract amendments. LTV's
original contract agreement provided thirty-fou_ million dollars for
design and construction of the basic transport system, including six
functioning subsystems. The airlines, who are actually paying for
5
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Airtrans, began pressuring the Board and LTV to get all functions
operating. The airlines claimed it was costing them more than one
million dollars a year above the basic cost of LTV's system to move
employees, trash, food, etc., with back-up buses and trucks.
Negotiations concerning cost overruns and poor performance bumped
along unevenly for several months, but in late September, 1975, talks
deadlocked and Airtrans was shut down once again (see Th___eDallas
Morning New____sand The Dallas Times Herald, September 30, 1975). The
cities of Dallas and Fort Worth, together with eight airlines, imme-
diately filed suit against LTV for more than 190 million dollars in
damages (c.f. The Dallas Times Herald , October l, 1975), while transit
buses were chartered to move passengers among the terminals. But this
service added another forty thousand dollars daily to the airport's
operating costs.
A few weeks later LTV filed a counter suit claiming 740 million
dollars in damages from Fort Worth, Dallas, the Airport Board, and
eight major airlines. LTV charged that the defendents' actions had
"... caused and (would) continue to cause damage to LTV's reputation
in the ground transportation field and its marketing efforts of Airtrans
around the world" (quoted in The Dallas Mornin_ New____s,October 25, 1975).
Airport Manager, Ernest Dean, confessed that the buses replacing
Airtrans were cheaper to operate, but went on to say "... after all,
this airport was designed around that automated fixed gulderail
6
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'people mover'" (quoted in The Dallas Times Herald, October 30, 1975).
For the airport, with enormous costs inyested in Airtrans, including
payments on the thirty-four million dollar indebtedness, the operation
of an expensive back-up system of trucks and buses generated great
pressure for a negotiated settlement. After several weeks of intense
bargaining, a tentative compromise was reached; but American Airlines,
in a strongly worded statement, rejected the proposal, which awarded an
additional seven million dollars to support LTV's cost overruns. Ameri-
can, s board chairman rejected the plan, contending that Airtrans "remains
unreliable, incomplete, and untested" (.The Dallas Morning New___._s,December
5, 1975). The American Airlines chief went on to say that there is no
reasonable basis for paying another seven million to LTV. The following
day, however, the airport board settled with LTV for 7.87 million dollars,
although four major airlines (Continental, Frontier, Eastern, and American)
objected and would not endorse the agreement. Their objections were
liberally sprinkled with innuendos that the settlement might breach
the airlines' agreements to pay D/FW, s operating costs.
In summary, one is forced to conclude that in this past year, the
Airtrans system cost a great deal more money, was responsible for much
bad press, further strained relationships among a variety of groups
responsible to and for the airport - all this, while the airport still
has but two functions of the original six, namely passengers and trash,
to show for the trouble.
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It is likely that LTVAerospace Corporation, a widely known defense
contractor, oversold the Airtrans technology, expecting that the airport
and airline officials, like those in their Department of Defense experience,
would support cost overruns without serious complaint once the airport
was committed to the Airtrans transportation system. Regardless of whether
LTV suspected early in the game that Airtrans could not be delivered for
the original contract price, the lesson is clear that local governments
and private corporations are a good deal more hesitant about supporting
unexpected capital outlays than are the Department of Defense and Congress.
Lastly, the Airtrans example offers no evidence that would enable
us to reject the conclusion, reached after the initial research at D/FW,
that focusing efforts on symbolic purposes results in a tendency toward
physical and technical excess, or that such excesses substantially in-
crease the probability that both designers and users will expect more
from the system than it can provide. Thus, disappointment, conflict,
and ultimately financial difficulty are liable to result.
At the same time local officials were embroiled in conflict over the
Airtrans system, they were lobbying intensely to acquire permission for
the British Concorde to begin scheduled operations from D/FW. Congress
concluded that we didn't need an SST, and FAA officials are reluctant
because the Concorde is noisy and does not meet FAA requirements for
fuel reserve. Still, the Manager of D/FW, the .Mm_vorsof Dallas and
r I
wFort Worth, and the Governor of Texas, among others, tried to work out an
agreement with the British and French.. They traveled to Washington to
intervene with the FAA and the Department of Transportation personally,
and filled the local press with the virtues and promise of flying the
SST from D/FW.
The Airport Manager argued that "this airport was designed to
handle supersonic planes" (quoted in The Dallas Times Herald, September
22, 1975). Moreover, the mayors of the mid-cities communities closest to
D/FW actively supported attempts to attract the SST, while many in their
communities have been publicly complaining about already existing noise
levels at D/FW. These mayors contended that in their communities noise
was indeed a problem, but they did not believe the SST would add sub-
stantially to it (c.f. Th___eDallas Morning News, January 18, 1976).
We are not suggesting that investing in symbolism is wrong; in fact,
it seems to be necessary for enlisting citizens' support of expensive
public projects. It appears, however, that there are overriding costs
involved when symbolic purposes are exchanged for economies or user
needs, and these costs, direct and indirect, can become part of an in-
creasing or reinforcing spiral if they are not acknowledged and discounted
in the design. We will continue with discussion of some discounting
methods in the concluding chapter.
Finances: "It was a tough year but we survived."
After losing a reported 3.5 million dollars in their first year of
w
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operation, the Airport Board and local officials have remained ominously
quiet about D/_W,s revenue/expenditure situation in the past year
(reported by Dallas Mayor Wes Wise in a Newsroom interview March 21,
1974). Over the past two years Airtrans, the baggage handling systems,
and the parking lots have generated less revenue or cost considerably
more than had been projected. Moreover, we are just beginning to re-
cover from the worst economic recession in more than thirty years, and
the commercial air industry was among those hit hardest as fuel prices
and utility costs jumped and people traveled less for business or
pleasure. The tables below clearly indicate that the actual operating
indicators for 1975 at D/FW are well below the most conservative pro-
jectlons.
The international air routes, which spokesmen had indicated are
crucial for financial stability at D/H, still have not materialized as
expected (c.f. our Fins/ Re___, February, 1975, PP. 48-50). To date,
only Air Canada has been added to the international route structure
available from D/FW. Moreover, the landing fees, by which the airlines
were to subsidize operating costs at D/FW, soared during the past year.
When D/FW opened the fee was $.65 per 1,000 pounds, which is considered
high; the comparable cost in the Washington area, for example, is about
$.35 per 1,O00 pounds. Last year the rate at D/FW climbed to $1.05 per
1,000 pounds. Though it has receded somewhat in recent months because
of increased air traffic in the wake of economic recovery, it remains
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close to $I.00 per 1,000 pounds.
In view of this evidence, we believ.e that financially D/FW is
running very close to the edge. Continued trepidation about Texas'
intra-state airline, Southwest Airlines, currently operating from
Love Field in Dallas, also suggests that local officials feel that D/_W
is financially vulnerable.
Love Field: "The politics of Love is reminiscent of the '01d Feud'"
The skirmishing continues unabated between the leadership of
Dallas and Fort Worth, the D/FW-based airlines, and Southwest Airlines
at Dallas' Love Field. Activities at Love Field have generally prospered,
notwithstanding the recession. In general aviation, Love Field has risen
from forty-eighth to the eleventh busiest field in the nation. Southwest
Airlines has doubled in size from two to four aircraft and reported a
fifty percent increase in pagsenger volume. A family entertainment
center was developed in a portion of the unused terminal building and
has prospered. In fact, Love still employs about one-half as many persons
as when all the airlines were housed there. Furthermore, the airport
is on schedule in its efforts to repay its remaining 8.2 million dollar
bonded indebtedness (c.f. The Dallas Times Herald, July 14, 1975, and
Th___eDalla______sMorningNews,July 13, 1975).
To date, Southwest Airlines, Love Field, and the City of Dallas
have been the winners in these skirmishes, in which the airlines and
13
the Fort Worth civic leaders have endeavored to have Love Field closed
to all air traffic. Southwest Airlines drew fire last year when it
received permission from the Texas Aeronautics Commission (TAC) to in-
crease its route structure to include the Rio Grande Valley, which is a
growing center for tourism and agrl-business. Recently Southwest again
petitioned the TAC to expand their Dallas-Houston-San Antonio-Harlingen
routes to include Austin, Corpus Christi, Midland-0dessa, Lubbock and
E1 Paso (c.f. The Dallas Morning News, March 25 and 26, 1976, and Th___e
Dallas Times Herald, March 28, 1976). The CAB-regulated interstate
airlines with extensive routes in Texas that operate out of D/FW are
vociferously opposed to Southwest's petition. The Mayor of Fort Worth
threatened legal action against Love Field if the additional routes are
approved. He stated that "... the additional service would have a
toppling domino effect which would destroy the financial stability of
Dallas-Fort Worth Airport." "... I would urge our council to authorize
a suit against the City of Dallas seeking to close Love Field and protect
the regional airport from unfair competition" (The Dallas Mqrning
Ne_ws, March 26, 1976).
The evidence continues to indicate that D/FW is in difficult
financial circumstances, a situation rendered no less difficult by the
long-standing antagonisms surfacing again and again between the parties
14
to the cooperative venture.* For example, SURTRAN, the transportation
system created by the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth, is losing money
overall. The Fort Worth routes account for most of the loss. Fort Worth
schedules and personnel have been reduced to cut operating costs, but
deficits continue. The cities and the SURTRAN Board agree, in principle,
to retain a consultant to perform a cost analysis and provide a means of
getting the ground transportation system operating in the black. Fort
Worth has formally approved this plan, but Dallas' City Council is hesl-
rating because it feels that Fort Worth is the primary contributor to the
operating deficits and as such, should pay the greater portion of the
consultant 's fee.
Ou_ point, simply stated, is that a cooperative venture, hobbled
by frequent disagreements, is not the best environment imaginable for
developing creative solutions to the tough problems facing D/FW.
*Former Dallas Mayor J. Erik Jonsson resigned as Chairman of the Airport
Board last January. The Fort Worth delegation felt that a Fort Worth
delegate should be named Chairman and that Dallas had agreed, informally,
to rotate the post. Dallas representatives, however, conceded no such
understanding and used their greater number on the Board to elect a man
of their choice (c.f. The Dallas _4ornin_ News, January 20, 1976).
15
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CHAPTER THREE
Kansas Cit_: "Ever_rtl_n_ Up to Date"
Kansas City International Airport (KCI) is, of the six airports we
investigated, most like D/FW in physical design and local elite's
expectations for the project. As a result, it has many of the strengths
and some of the difficulties displayed by D/FW.
Both were to serve as symbols of modernity promising bright futures
to all who passed through their gates. The citizens of the Kansas City
area, like those in Dallas/Fort Worth, are discovering that invest-
ment in symbolic function can be expensive. The harvest reaped includes
design-based impediments to smooth passenger air to ground to air
transfer, disappointing inability to perceive expected economic impacts,
insufficient revenue and general bewilderment that optimistic expecta-
tions are not materializing.
This is not to say that the history, design, or operation of KCI
is precisely analogous to that of D/FW. The airport at Kansas City did
not develop in an atmosphere of uneasy agreement built from conflict
resolution. We found no evidence of serious disagreement among citizen
groups, news media, elected leaders, administrative officials, and the
design team. An experienced group designed and constructed KCI; Burns
and McDonnell Engineers, who had been responsible for the construction
at Dulles, also built the airport at Kansas City. Moreover, we did not
16
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wfind that KCI, though the most like D/FW of the facilities we studied,
was as technically intense or had as muQh excess capacity. Thus, KCI
is not so dramatic as D/FW and drama is important if the symbolic
function is to be effective. But then, KCI has been less troublesome
and costly to operate. There is no indication that passengers have
been seriously inconvenienced or that the airport' s operation has
been completely hobbled by technical or design-related difficulties.
Our point is that, though KCI is experiencing development pains
much like those being encountered by D/2W, the difficulties have not
been as intense for the Kansas City facility because of what seem to
be slight technical and design differences. Thus, KCI has accumulated
a four million dollar operating deficit in three years, while D/FW
lost three and a half million dollars in its first year alone.
Kansas City International Airport is Kansas City's answer to
air transportation needs in the last third of this century. When it
opened in November of 1972, after several costly and delaying labor
disputes, the City, the airlines and the federal government had invested
over 250 million dollars in this facility. 1 At the time the green light
1
Phase I consists of three terminal modules, one north-south runway
(10,800 feet), one east-west runway (9,500 feet), and support facilities
normally associated with large hub airports. Phase II will provide a
fourth module and a third parallel 10,800 foot runway. Phase III will add
a fourth north-south runway extendable to 15,100 feet, plus additional
terminal and cargo facilities. Both Phase II (early 1980's) and Phase III
(1992) implementation have been postponed for the dates scheduled.
17
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was given for KCI, it appeared that the air traffic problem had reached
crisis proportions. According to an article in the Kansas City Star,
"The skies are crowded - even heavily congested in the larger metropol-
itan centers - and conditions are getting worse... But a situation
that can be controlled now would probably be running wild in another
five to ten years" (Kansas City Star, October 9, 1966). A confidential
report prepared for the city council states that "Kansas City must place
highest priority on obtaining the rapid and orderly development of KCI
to insure the future role of the city against possible stagnation and
deterioration as a place to live and work" (Potential Role of KCI A!rgort ,
by Hammer, Greene, Siler Associates, February, 1970, p. iii). Harding
Lawrence, President of Braniff International, speaking before the Rotary
Club of Kansas City said, "There is no doubt that Kansas City will become
a new international gateway to the world's major cities" (Kansas City
Star, November 17, 1966).
Site Selection
Most of the land for KCI, about 4,600 acres, was originally pur-
chased by the City in 1953-1954. Later purchases increased the airport
area to its present size - 5,000 acres.2 The airport is located in
Platte County some nineteen miles northwest of downtown Kansas City.
2
The original price per acre was $350.00. Land in this area is selling
now for $4,000.00 per acre.
18
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The devastating flood of 1951 demolished TWA, s overhaul facilities
in Fairfax, Kansas (across the river from Kansas City, Missouri).
At that time, the present site was selected; a runway and support
facilities were built in order to insure that TWA would remain in the
Kansas City area.
It was not until 1963, however, that the City was forced to decide
whether a new airport would be built for the area. In that year the
FAA indicated to the City that no more funding would be provided for
the Municipal Airport (located one mile from downtown area). The
Regional Director of the FAA, John Beardslee, described Municipal
Airport as
• . . one of the poorest major airports in the country for
large jet aircraft. It has the highest weather and aircraft
load minimums of any fully-equipped airport in the region.
No matter how our landing aids are improved, these weather
minimums cannot be lowered• . . It seems to us to be only a
matter of time until the new airplanes just will not fit into
Municipal (Kansas _ Star, August 28, 1963).
In response to Beardslee's comments, Ilus Davis, the M_yor of Kausas
City, stated:
Since you have spoken, I have changed my mind completely
about the urgency of developing Mid-Continent (KCI).
I think we have a public responsibility to use Mid-
Continent (Kansas City Star, August 28, 1963).
Although two additional sites were considered, 3 the present site
3
The other sites considered were in the river bottom, five miles from
the downtown area, and in Jackson County, southeast of the city.
19
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was in the most favored position because the land had already been
acquired and TWA had located its major overhaul facilities in the area.
It was not until 1966, after concept studies were conducted by Burns
and McDonnell and with the advent of the wide-body Boeing 7h7' s, that
the decision was made to issue 150 million dollars in non-taxable
reserve bonds to support the construction effort. The airlines were
to repay the bond issue cut of rentals and landing fees. The voters
of Kansas City approved the bond issue by an overwhelming margin
(for: 57,897; against: 2,339). Referring to this victory, Mayor
Davis said, "They seized the vision of the future. They did it, no
one else" (Kansas _ Star, December 14, 1966). As evidenced by the
vote and the strong leadership of Mayor Davis, h very little opposition
was voiced against KCI. The airlines, primarily TWA and Braniff, 5
supported Mayor Davis. According to our interviewees, it was Davis who
was the prime mover behind KCI, while TWA was mainly responsible for
the ultimate design concept that was accepted for the airport.
Plannin_ Design and Construction
In all, eight concept/deslgns were considered. 6 Very close attention
4
Mayor Ilus Davis served as mayor for eight years and a total of fifteen
years on the City Council.
5
TWA generates about forty-five percent of the air activity at KCI.
Braniff International's share is about twenty-five to thirty percent.
6
For a detailed discussion of these designs see Mid-Continent International
Airport _ _ Concept Des__, Burns and McDonnell, Kivett and Myers,
August 27, 1965.
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was paid to both the ladles and Tampa designs. The Dulles design was
not adopted because the passenger transfer vehicles were too costly and
there was an ever-present possibility of drivers going on strike.
_rthermore, the design was not acceptable to TWA for the same reasons.
The Tampa design was rejected because it appeared to the airlines to be
little more thau an automated version of Dulles. The Burns and McDonnell
report states :
The airlines.., have specifically stated that Concept 3
(Dulles) would be unacceptable because of operational
problems and the use of the mechanical device between
terminals and the aircraft. It has been indicated that
this same position is applicable to Concept 4 (Tampa).
Another factor that was considered and ultimately led to the choice
of the present design is that Kansas City had very few transfer passengers -
only eight percent of their total passengers. This statistic, according
to our interviewees, together with TWA,s insistence on direct access to
the gate in order to maintain its public relations image of the moment,
led to the present choice.
"The world's shortest walk to fly", and the "Drive to your _te"
concepts are public relations phrases adopted to describe KCI. According
to Burns and McDonnell, "This concept produces the capability of delivering
the passengers virtually to the door of the aircraft." "In its purest
form each gate could become essentially a terminal in itself, with complete
decentralization." A passenger's walking distance is about seventy-flve
feet from curbside dropoff and check-in to the aircraft loading ramp (see
21
wIllustration I for complete details).
The design of each terminal building is fairly flexible. Each
terminal has three levels: baggage on the air side, passenger, and
mezzanine levels. On the apron side it is possible to eventually
add fingers for further gates. This is not imminently anticipated;
in both the Braniff and Continental terminals there are several gates
that are not presently in use.
Ironically, one of the factors that sold local officials on the
need to build KCI was the advent of the Boeing 7_7's. However, the
present configuration of each terminal module is such that passengers
and baggage on 7_7's cannot be processed. In fact, the interior de-
sign of the terminals requires that passengers spill over into the
aisle of the terminal, thus making it virtually impossible for others
to move from point to point within each terminal.
Though it was constructed to meet the needs of the jumbo jet era,
in 1975 the daily breakdown by aircraft for KCI was as follows:
TYPE OF AIRC_ NUMBERS
747 130
DC-9 33
580 33
FH 17
707 12
737 I0
LIOII 2
As one can readily see, KCI is used by approximately as many small
to medium size aircraft as jumbo jets and, considering the problems
22
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associated with large numbers of passengers in the KCI terminal, it
is fortunate that nearly one half of the service is provided by smaller
aircraft.
Another major problem of the airport design is inter-terminal
transportation for transfer passengers. The Westinghouse people mover
system (comparable to Airtrans at D/FW) was examined but rejected by
the airlines because they felt it was too costly. Inter-termlnal trans-
portation is currently provided by buses which charge twenty-five cents
per passenger.
Economic Expectations
Projections of total passenger volume were based on the unusually
high growth rate in the sixties, and an anticipation of even higher
growth rates in the decades to follow.
curve from 1980 to 1990.
Notice the steep ascent of the
PROJECTIONS (IN MILLIONS) ACTUAL
1972 4,150,000 3,800,000
1974 4,750,000 h,075,398
1975 5,600,000 4,460,000
1980 6,h00,000 --
1990 19,000,000 --
These projected activity levels were supported by two basic argu-
ments: (1) the anticipated growth of the national market in air traffic,
of whichKCI will capture a larger share due to saturation at Chicago
and St. Louis; and (2) the continued growth of the regional economy and
L _
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the regional center functions of Kansas City (Potential Role of KC_.!I
Airport, o__. ci___t.,p. 17).
It was anticipated that the development of KCI would have wide-
spread effect on the economy of the Kansas City Metropolitan Region
(KCMR). "It can be expected that many new economic activities will
result from this development, including new basic industries directly
related to air transportation and aircraft operations, and also new
industries that seek a location near major airports, even though not
directly related to the airport" (Ibi____d.,p. 17). Thus far, this has not
been the case. Major population shifts have occurred to the south
(Johnson County) and to the southeast (Cass County) of the metropolitan
area. In fact, Wyandotte County (Kansas City) lost population during
the 1960-1973 period (Statistical Observations o__nPopulation Growth
Trends Within the Kansas City MetropolitanReglon, April, 1975, Kansas
City Development Department). KCI was intended to serve as an economic
and developmental accelerator. Other projects that have been undertaken
for the KCMR since the initiation of KCI are downtown urban renewal, con-
struction of a Convention Center Complex (the 1976 Republican Convention
will be held there), and the Kansas City, Kansas Renewal Program. All
of these projects envisioned that the KCMR had "reached a threshold size
and momentum requlred for accelerated growth in the foreseeable future"
(Potential Role of KC___I,o__. ci___t.,p. 22). It is estimated that this
25
revitalization plan will cost about _.4 billion dollsms, of which
-= seventy-five p_rcent is being underwrittenbyKansas City businessmen
..... ( he w Yor__/k imes,July22,1975).
-- A General Planned Development District (Kansas City Ordinance
No. CS-37803) has been created for the purpose of attracting an assort-
ment of industries and residences in the area of KCI. This plan requires
strict land use control zones for the overall development of the area
until the year 2,000 (,see Illustration II). In addition, land use
policies have been established for sound-sensitive areas around KCI
using the guidelines recommended by the FAA in 1972 (see Illustration
III). According to Howard Willoughby, Deputy Aviation Director for
KCI, very few noise complaints - no more thau six - are received by the
Authority on a monthly basis. This is a rural area that is not well
developed, although this could change if the airport engenders construction
in the area. 7 This stagnation is partially attributable to the setting,
but a further explanation may be found in the speculative land dealings
that have taken place in the KCI area. We have already noted that an
acre of land in this area now sells for about $4,000, as compared to
$350 per acre for the same type of land in 1954. Naturally, such inflated
laud costs are not attractive to those wishing to develop in this area.
7
No environmental impact study was made for KCI at the outset, tho1_h
one is currently pending before the FAA.
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A further contributing factor to the area's underdevelopment is its
isolation from the principal marketing and employment sectors of Kansas
City. There are neither rail systems nor freeways connecting the area
around KCI to the Kansas City metropolitan region. In fact, this area
may not begin to fully develop until highways I-h35 aud 1-635 are com-
pleted in mid-198% (these will be circumferential freeways around the
Kansas City metropolitan area).
Most of the passengers using KCI come from the southern part of
the KSMR, namely Johnson, Cass, and Jackson Counties. In a study that
was conducted recently, passengers originating from this region increased
in number by fourteen percent - from a total of twenty-eight percent of
the trip origins in 1967 to forty-two percent in 1973 (Mid-America
Regional Council, REMARC, September 2, 1973, p. 12). 8 The initial
optimism expressed for the KCI area is reflected in the construction of
five new hotels, adding 1,100 rooms to the area near KCI. As of this
writing only one of the five is makingmoney, the Marriott, which is
located on the airport. It is too soon to tell whether the long-range
forecasts leading to such construction will be correct, but the survival
8
Passengers originating from the downtown area (including the Crown
Center and Alameda Plaza) use the KCI express bus to commute to the
airport. Since 1972 this service has lost money. Negotiations are
presently in progress for Kansas City to purchase the KCI Express.
_z J
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of these hotels is presently in jeopardy, and future development does
not seem likely, according to our interviewees.
The optimistic predictions for KCI, voiced by many public officials,
arestill not being met, and it has now been in operation for four years.
"KCI will itself be worth three hundred million dollars at 1978 prices
with another three hundred million in related facilities - freeways,
motels, office buildings, homes and other construction" (Kansas
Star, January lh, 1968).
Economic strife is reflected in the operation of the airport itself.
At the end of 1975, four years after it opened, KCI is four million
dollars in debt, which the airlines have had to underwrite. According
to some of the airlines' officials interviewed, they are greatly con-
cerned about these imbalances.
Current 0perationsr Problems and Prospects
Many similarities exist between the KCI experience and D/FW.
Both see themselves as gateway airports of international stature, when,
in fact, each has relatively few international flights. 9 KCI was also
envisioned as a growth generator for the region, supposedly encompassing
an area of 700 square miles (Environmental Development and Impact
Study, Runnells and Roesslin, 1970, p. 1). Kansas City International,
like D/FW, has not fulfilled these expectations. In fact, in both
9
KCI has one route to Mexico City which departs and arrives once a week.
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cases simplistic economic forecast models were used to justify the
original proposals and sell the projects to the respective com-
munities.
A departure from the D/FW experience can be observed in the kind
of leadership and design team that was assembled for KCI. The com-
munity as a whole was quite cohesive in its desire to build it. The
community leaders, especially Mayor Ilus Davis, were not fettered by
controversy, and the design engineers (Burns and McDonnell) were ex-
perienced; they built Dulles International for Aaman and Whitney.
This experienced group was instrumental in building a relatively
less-technically intense system - as compared to D/H, for example -
to meet the needs of Kansas City citizenry.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Dulles: An Impressive First
Dulles International Airport, serving the Washington, D. C. metro-
politan area, has been in operatiou longer than any other regional
airport. It was, in the words of architect Eero Saarinen, the first
airport conceived and designed for commercial jet aircraft. Moreover,
it may well be the most architecturally distinctive air facility in the
United States. Though it has been operating nearly fifteen years, it
is a remarkably modern facility.
In one respect, Dulles grew out of regional conflict; that is, local
opposition near the first selected site stalled construction for seven
years. But this conflict left no legacy of uneasy truce among warrlng
interests. Unlike other airports we studied, Dulles is not the creature
of local, regional, state and federal authorities. Like Mirabel at
Montreal (see Chapter Five), Dulles was funded and developed by the
federal government, and the Washington Airport Authority manages Dulles
and Washington National for the FAA. Despite obstacles and delays,
neither Congress nor the CAA (predecessor to the FAA) wavered in their
determination to build a second airport for the Washington area.
Dul!es was our first regional airport, rendering the question of
design experience moot. Indeed, its design features are still carefully
studied by designers of other major airports. The Dulles plan was adopted
L
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for Mirabel at Montreal, and it was studied by the Dallas/Fort Worth,
St. Louis, and Kansas City design teama, to name but a few.
The design of Dulles owes much to famed architect Eero Saarinen,
aud this was his first airport project. The design is unusually flexi-
ble, but also dramatic and technically intense. Dulles has had its
share of operating problems, and revenues cannot seem to catch up to
costs. Still, technical failures and design-related inadequacies have
not unduly inconvenienced passengers at Dulles. In fact, except for
its remoteness, it is one of the more passenger-accommodating faciiities
we have studied.
Costs have been a problem at Dulles as they have for all the regional
airports; indeed, operating losses have been a particular problem here.
But costs and losses have been less important for Dulles than for other
regional airports. Dulles was very expensive to construct and use has
lagged disappointingly. But Congress paid for Dulles, and though Dulles
is obligated to repay these outlays from its revenues, its fate and
that of the airlines or local communities does not rest on malntainin_
scheduled debt service to a bonded indebtedness. Still, according to
all calculations, Dulles has accumulated a considerable operating deficit
i
over the past fifteen years.
Planuing, Design and Construction
The Dulles terminal is striking visually; it is dramatic archi-
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tecture. The late Eero Saarinen, world famous architect, created the
terminal complex and regarded it as his best work. Noted architectural
critic, Ada Louise Huxtable, commenting on Dulles, wrote: "Saarinen's
avowed purpose, realized beyond anyone's most optimistic hopes, was to
devise a symbolic entrance to the nation" (The New York Times, April 8,
1962). Similarly, an engineer that had worked on the construction of the
airport reported in an interview that there was a widely-shared commit-
ment among those who werked on it that Dulles would be special. There
is a trace of irony here in that Saarinen himself said that he carefully
cast the terminal building so that its dramatic effect would be focused
on the persons driving to the airport to depart, and pick up or drop
passengers. The visitor actually entering the nation's capitol is
treated to a somewhat squatty rear view of the terminal. So it would
seem that the symbolism was not so much for the occasional visitor as
for the local and frequent traveler. This should not be surprising, since
the local citizens are likely to have the most visual and practical or
user contact and must, in their own minds, justify the costs to the region.
It is fortunate that the federal government owns Dulles, even though
much of the local citizenry is associated with the legislative and execu-
tive branches in one way or another. Some of them have important roles
in certification or appropriation of monies for the airport. And, too,
a regional airport imposes indirect, as well as direct costs. There is
the valuable space it occupies, the added traffic, noise, some added risk
v
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and the sometimes considerably increased strain on utilities.
Site Selection - The Burke Site; a tiny town stops the federal regional
airport.
Dulles' present location near Chantilly, Virginia, about thirty
miles west of Washington, was not the first site chosen for the regional
airport. A Department of Commerce report, prepared in 1951 by the CAA
and published in 1955, provided a summary evaluation of all the possible
locations for a regional airport in the Washington area. This report
concluded that Andrews Field, a few minutes southeast of Washington,
was the overall best choice. Andrews was close and in use as an Air
Force Base, so the cost of further development or modification would be
considerably less than beginning anew. Thus, the Aeronautics Administra-
tion specialists recommended that "Congress approve a course of action
leading to the construction of facilities at Andrews Field for the pur-
pose of using it jointly as a civil/military airport" (Commerce Repgrt,
1955, p. 1).
The report went on to name a site near Burke, Virginia as the best
alternate. The Burke site was a little further out from the center of
Washington than Andrews Field and it was not developed, but it was a
strong second choice. In 1951 and 1952 the military did not want Andrews'
military use compromised by joint development. The records subsequent
to the 1951 CAA evaluation seldom mention Andrews Field as a possibility,
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and then only with a passing reference to the military's need for
exclusive use.
In view of the military recalcitrance with respect to Andrews, and
the Department,s recommendation, the Secretary of Commerce directed
that right-of-way acquisition commence in the Burke area. In 1950
Congress had authorized fourteen million dollars for the construction
of a regional airport in the Washington area, and the Secretary had
requested slightly more than two million dollars for land acquisition.
However, the Secretary had not named a specific site in this request
and the Congress appropriated only one million.
In February of 1952 the Civil Aeronautics Administrator sought a
supplemental appropriation for 1.6 million dollars in order to purchase
more land and award contracts for engineering designs. When the request
surfaced in a House Appropriations Committee hearing, strong and well-
organized opposition to the proposed development at the Burke site became
apparent. Congress stalled. Between 19%3 and 19_ they awarded no
additional appropriation, and the government withdrew the condemnation
suits that had been filed in order to obtain the remaining properties
necessary to construct the airport near Burke. At this point more than
1,O00 acres of land had been purchased. When interviewed about the
problem at Burke, none of the officials presently associated with the FAA
in Washington or the Airport Authority had been in Washington during that
period; but the consensus among them, based on hearsay, was that a small,
36
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but very determined group of residents from the Burke area worked
effeotively through the Virginia Congressional delegation to stop
action. The feeling from those now associated with the FAA in
Washington and the Washington airport system was that the common con-
cerns of noise, safety, traffic, and unsavory development motivated the
opposition.
There can be no question that the opponents were determined. They
were so effective that nearly four years later, when the Senate was being
pressed again by the CAA to get the Burke project moving, this opposi-
tion again materialized and the appropriations were not awarded. But
the Congress, too, had growa more determined in the interim. House
and Senate action on the question continued until, about a year later
in August of 1957, the Congress appropriated 12.5 million dollars to the
Department of Commerce for development of an airport near Washington.
However, Congress stipulated that the Executive must once again study
the question of site and report the findings to Congress before January
1%, 19_8 - a matter of only four months.
Special Assistant to the President, Elwood R. Quesada - soon to be
the first Administrator of the FAA - retained Greiner-Mattern, Associates
to do another site study. The Greiner-Mattern group, a firm of engineers
and architects, reviewed basically the same sites that had been studied
seven years earlier by the CAA speoialists, including Andrews and Burke.
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Yet, in their summary letter to Mr. Quesada, they reported:
It is our considered opinion, based upon all technical
and en_ineerlng information which has been accumulated,
studied, and analyzed by our offices, that the vicinity
of Chantilly, Virginia affords the site best suited for
the development of an additional airport to serve the
National Capitol Region (letter of December 31, 1957
to E. R. Quesada from Greiner-Mattern Associates).
(Emphasis added by this writer)
Andrews and Burke were not even considered as sites in this report,
while in the earlier CAA study Chantilly was thought to be a very poor
third behind these two. In both studies, ground transportation time to
and from downtown Washington, locations of heavy-user neighborhoods, and
Washington National Airport were important criteria and carefully studied.
In the CAA analysis of the Chantilly site it was concluded that "ground
transportation travel time to Washington and Washington National Airport
would be substantially in excess of the acceptable maximum set up in the
specifications" (Commerce Reoort, 1955, p. 3).
Of those sites which were acceptable in other respects - geography,
population density, sufficient land available, and room for approach and
departure patterns - Chantilly was the most remote. In fact, the Grelner-
Mattern report indicates that in 1955, 73.7 percent of the region's ori-
ginating passengers would be within thirty minutes of Burke, while only
20.8 percent were within thirty minutes of Chantilly. Moreover, the
projections for ground time claim that these ratios will be essentially
unchanged, 71.1 and 23.0 percents respectively, through 1980.
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It is then difficult for us to agree with the Greiner-Mattern
claim that Chantilly, the present site, was chosen on the basis of
technical criteria alone.
In May of 1958, nearly eight years after Congress authorized a
second airport to serve Washington, the New York-based engineering firm
of Azmann and Whitney was selected as the prime contractor for the new
airport to be constructed at Chantilly, Virginia. The basic concept and
the need had grown since 1950; the _,000 acre Burke site had become lO,O00
acres for Chantilly, and the fourteen million dollar project anticipated in
1950 was projected to cost fifty million in 1958. This represents about a
three-fold increase in cost after correcting for inflation. When the air-
port opened four years later, the projected fifty million dollar cost had,
by that time, grown to llO million.
Ammann and Whitney selected architect Eero Sas_rinen from Michigan
to design the terminal buildings and control tower, and Ellery Hulsted
from Washington to serve as master planning consultant.
Field lay-out: Dulles has ll,500 foot parallel runways spaced 6,500
feet apart. There is also a third off-wind strip lO,O00 feet long. Two
STOL strips (one lighted), 1,500 feet in length, have also been installed.
The master plan indicates that a fourth runway parallel to the cross wind
may be constructed with minimum disruption, if it is needed.
VTOL/STOL at Dulles: It is likely that those responsible for choosing
4
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|and designing the airport for the Chantilly site hoped to minimize the
problems raised by its remote location with an active VTOL and/or
STOL schedule. The press reported that Congress was not happy about
the decision to build in remote Virginia (c.f. The New York Times,
January 15, 1958). When the master plan was published, shortly after
the airfield opened in 1962, the design group projected a 180,000
passenger volume and 14,400 STOL operations in 1965. By 1975 they believed
STOL operations would handle 770,000 passengers in 3_,200 operations
annually.
Inexplicably, the reality with regard to VTOL/STOL operations has
diverged widely from the expectations. There has never been a helicopter
operation from Dulles to other airports in the region or to central
Washington. Several persons interviewed reported that they believed
several companies had attempted to get approval for a take-off and
landing pad near Capitol Hill, downtown, and close to the Executive
Office Building. In fact, the consensus was that one such application
was being considered at the time of the interview. The New York Times
in June of 1967 reported that eleven of the airlines serving the capitol
region asked the CAA to approve a helicopter service linking the three
airports and downtown Washington. The airlines further offered to under-
write any losses the service sustained. We were not able to confirm the
veracity of these rumors or the article in the Times; but the fact remains
4O
that helicopter service betweenDulles and several areas in Washington
is sorely needed and has never been attempted.
There was, however, a small, one-plane STOL operation that flew
between Dulles, Washington Natlonal, and Baltimore' s Friendship Airport.
The operation was supported by all three airports. STOL strips were
installed where necessary, and special approach, departure and landing
take-off procedures were developed to accommodate the needs of the
operation. Several individuals reported that the Washington system
airport management had great hopes for this enterprise. Everyone was
reportedly quite disappointed when after a year of operating at .7
passengers per trip, the owner was bankrupt and the operation had failed.
It appears to us that the need is not so much for inter-airport STOL
arrangements in the Washington area, but for STOL service in and out of
the District.
Terminal: Before designing the terminal complex, Saarlnen "... sent
out teams with counters and stopwatches to see what people really do at
airports, how far they walk, their interchange problems." "We analyzed
special problems of jets, examined schedules, peak loads, effects of
weather." "We studied baggage handling, economics, methods of operation,
and so on" (from R__ort of Comments by Eer____oSaarinen about th___eDulles
International Terminal Building, 1961).
As a result of his studies, the architect concentrated the design
around the problems of time and convenience for passengers getting to and
%.F
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from the aircraft, the high cost of taxiing Jet planes for long distances,
and the need for flexibility in operating and servicing large Jet aircraft,
This led Saarinen and his associates to the conclusion that taking the
passenger to the plane, rather than bringing the plane to the passenger,
was the more sensible approach. This, in turn, led them to the now
famous mobile lounge concept - a method of taking passengers from terminal
to plane, rather than the more common alternative.
When it came to the physical design of the terminal, the mobile
lounge approach enabled Saarinen to choose a single, compact building.
He felt that the airport was unique in that it would be "a part of the
whole complex of buildings that create the image of our nation's capitol.
. . . the terminal building should express that in its architectural
design" (Ssarinen, Report, p. 2). Saarinen went on to say that "the
tradition of federal architecture is static, but a jet airport should be
essentially non-static, expressing the movement and the excitement of
travel. We thought that if we could bring these two things together
into a unified design, we would have a very interesting building" (Saarinen,
Report, p. 2).
There is no question but that the soaring terminal building offers
a dramatic exterior facade. But what of the interior where users spend
most of their time? Saarinen said that the "... interior should convey
the same special and distinctive character we tried to give the archi-
tecture itself." "Instead of the honky-tonk, Klondike-like chaos of
_2
ww
F 4
commercial space in most airports, all the interiors and commercial
space should be thoughtfully organized to be dignified and attractive"
(Saarinen, Report, p. 3).
It is our opinion that Saarlnen was not as successful with the
interior design as with the exterior. The Dulles terminal is not
"rinky-tink", but then neither is it warm and friendly. It is large
and lonely with seats placed in long rows, bolted together with armrests
clearly marking off each person's space (see Robert Sommer's "Our Air-
ports are Sociofugal, Not Sociopeta!, and It's an Outrage" in Th__eN__ew
York Times Ma_azine, March 3, 1974).
The interior is not without its technical problems as well. According
to one airport official interviewed, the public address system was so
technically advanced as to be one of a kind when it was installed, and
as a result, maintenance has been a nightmare. In fact, the airport's
maintenance people basically have redesigned and replaced the original
public address system. Similarly, a special sign system was constructed
for the termlnal's interior by an Italian firm. This, too, frustrates
the maintenance personnel at Dulles. General maintenance and repair on
the sign system is almost impossible because the instructions and schematics
for the system are printed in Italian. It seems that Dulles, in its own
way, like D/FW, is paying for heavy emphasis on the dramatic or symbolic
in its design.
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The Mobile Lounge: The mobile lounge has been widely publicized
as a remarkable idea, and the evidence .seems to indicate that overall
those in use have been quite functional. However, some of the officials
interviewed at Dulles talked as if the mobile lounges were little more
than a slightly happier version of the Airtrans system at D/_W. The
first mobile lounges were manufactured by Chrysler, who subcontracted
the body building to Budd. Apparently, the bodies built by Budd were
very good because they are still in operation; but Dulles officials
claimed that the components supplied by Chrysler were not as good. The
lounges were powered by gasoline engines designed for automobiles in
which the power had been boosted simply by pouring more raw gas into the
engine through a bigger carburator. As a result, the engines burned out
very quickly. The transmissions, it seems, were similarly underdesigned,
while the air-conditioners were not applicable to the mobile lounge at
all. The air-conditioners were basically four room-type units hooked
together in such a way that service was not feasible. After the airport
manager ordered the exchange of the engines and transmissions for diesels
and heavy-duty transmissions and replaced the air-conditioning systems,
the lounges performed very reliably.
Nevertheless, the mobile lounges continue to attract their share of
critics, as well as supporters. Architectural critic, Paul Goldberger,
claims that they are silly and inconvenient and "whatever pretentious
words were uttered about the lounges as an advance in airport technology,
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their real purpose was to keep the elegant terminal building free of
protruding fingers" (Esquire, February, 1976, p. 104). Architectural
historian Vincent Scully contemptuously dismissed them as "Afrika Korps
troop carriers" (quoted by Paul Goldberger in Esquire, February, 1976,
p. lO4).
We feel that whatever the intended purpose for the mobile lounges,
they offer an economy, flexibility, and concern for passengers and
operations personnel we have not found in other airports.
Other Difficulties
Utilities: Heating and air-conditioning for the new airport is a
single, central installation. But the Dulles design, unlike that for
D/H, for example, did not have excess utilities capacity. The system
at DUlles was designed for the first stage construction, and according
to the master plan, new construction must include additional heating and
cooling installations.
The airport at Chantilly, on the other hand, was plagued by sewage
and run-off drainage problems, and when the local communities felt they
could not process waste and run-off from the airport, the objections
became so strenuous that they were raised in Congress by the Virginia
delegation. The Congressional solution was interesting: sewage and
drainage from the airport was tied to the District's water treatment
system. This "interceptor" sewer line was constructed with a twenty-five
45
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million dollar loan authorized by Congress. The new sewer line was
large enough to accommodate the airport' s needs, as well as those of
the many growing communities in the area. Thus the loan was to be repaid
by these "secondary customers" using the facility. The remedy effectively
checked this type of local opposition to the new airport facility.
Access: No planned or existing state or federal highway passed close
to the Chantilly site. A dual, four-lane roadway was constructed from
major arterial connections, including the Capitol Beltway and Inter-state
66, to the terminal complex. The route selected was slightly less than
twenty miles. The idea was to reserve this road for airport traffic.
Toward that end, few interchanges were constructed and space was reserved
to lay outer roadways to serve surrounding communities when the need
developed. At the time of the airport's construction commuter traffic
was no problem. One of the site criteria at Chantilly that was more
than adequately fulfilled, was that of low population density in the
region of the airport.
Despite the deliberate attempt to provide a flexible access system,
Dulles officials commented that they are now having difficulty keeping the
road free of commuter traffic. Neither the state nor the counties involved
want to expend their limited revenues to construct the outer roadways
provided for in the initial design, especially when a beautifully con-
structed and maintained four-lane access highwsy is already in place and
hardly used by today's standards. Thus far, the Secretary of Transportation
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has been able to stay commuters' demands for more and better access by
invoking the "intent of Congress" when .the enabling legislation for
the Dulles access highway was approved.
Noise: Until quite recently, the Dulles Airport has not had any
difficulty over noise. In the early years of its operation, under-utili-
zation, low population density, and remoteness combined to protect the
airport from such complaints. And too, 10,O00 acres allows quite a bit
of space to absorb the particularly intense noises associated with approach
and departures of planes. In addition to all this, the airport boundary
is lined with a thick belt of trees to beautify and further absorb noise.
Though Congress and the Executive remained embroiled in controversy with
communities in the Burke area for more than seven years over this issue,
the master plan does not even mention the problem.
Officials associated with Dulles and the Washington airport system
admitted that they had been getting complaints about Dulles' noise in the
past three or four years because of increased suburban development near
the airport. It appears to be very difficult to cope with a noise problem,
as it is so often emphemeral. One official recited the story of a civic
group leader from a community near the airport who came to them not long
ago to talk about noise problems in his community. The civic leader
said he understood the necessity to alter flight patterns after an airliner
crashed into a mountainside a year or two before. He claimed that the
citizens in his community also understood and had been patient; but they
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wfelt the airport officials had had enough time to correct difficulties
and/or acquire better approach equipmer_t. The agitated citizen con-
cluded by fervently petitioning the officials to reinstate the original
flight patterns so the noisy aircraft would not be continually overflying
their neighborhoods.
The astonished officials attempted to convince the spokesman that
the approach and departure routes had not, as a result of the crash or for
any other reason, been chan_in any detail. They had considerable diffi-
culty convincing the citizen of their veracity. When asked what had
happened, the official shrugged and said that the citizens probably had
not noticed the aircraft flying near them until the publicity surrounding
an accident in their vicinity sensitized them and they could not help but
notice the aircraft thereafter.
Press: The press coverage of the Dulles Airport over the years seems
to have been very like that for D/FW. The airport is either ballyhooed
as the finest example of this or that, or it is ridiculed as the world's
single largest white elephant.
Current Operations, Problems and Prospects
Eighteen Months Late and Still Trying to Catch Up: Dulles was scheduled
to begin operation early in 1961, but like most projects of similar scope
and difficulty, it was not ready on time. The schedule slipped further
and further and the airport did not begin operating until November of
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w1962 - nearly eighteen months later. Ever since it opened, officials
associated with the airport have been claiming that it is just about to
come into its own (c.f. The New York Time____s,November 20, 1964). In fact,
we even heard it when we were working in the Washington area. It seems
that people have preferred the convenience of overcrowded, unsightly
Washington National to the beautiful but remote Dulles. The original
expectation was that Washington National would level off at its "design
capacity" of six million passengers per year, while Dulles assumed the
growth curve. But the fact is that Washington National has ballooned to
more than eleven million passengers annually, while Dulles limps along
nearly empty most of the time (see Chart I below). One can readily see
from these charts that Dulles has not begun to fulfill its designers'
expectations. 0nly in the area of cargo has it at last begun to measure
up to the plan. Moreover, it is not clear whether Dulles would be ca_rrying
its present share of the region's air passengers if the FAA, in 1966,
had not forced the airlines to increase their schedules from Dulles by
limiting National to short or mid-range jet aircraft and to flights of
500 nautical miles or less. This action doubled the daily aircraft
operations at Dulles, increasing take-offs and landings from 90 to 180
(c.f. Th__eeNe.__wYo__rkTimes, July 12, 1966). Yet it is obvious that many
airlines have circumvented this FAA limitation by scheduling many of
their flights to Washington National with an intermediate stop at a city
within the 500 mile limit.
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CHART 1
PASSENGER VOLUME (Millions)
MASTER PLAN PROJETIONS ACTUAL PASSENGER VOLUME_
z
DULLES
1965 4.4 .863
1975 8.6 2.6
U/t/mate 14
r
NATIONAL
1965
1975
6.5
(1974) - 11.0
(_)Fmm F A.A. Department of Aviation Economics
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CHART 2
_AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS (Thousands)
®
DULLES
" " 1965 il4
1975 218
Ultimate Design 280
Capacity
131
w
NATIONAL
1965 290 297
1975 . 3_J6 No Data
CDMilitary operations not included in figures for Dulles and National
(_)From F.A.A. Department of Aviation Economics
w
w
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CHART 3
ilmll • n, ,
DULLES
1965
1975
.......Ultimate Design
Capacity
CARGO (Includin_ mail) in Tons (Thou,sands)
0
MASTER PLAN PROJECTIONS ACTUAL CARGO
20.9 13.8
39.9
59.9
1974-48.8
T
(_) From F.A.A Department of Aviation Economics
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REPRODUCIBILITY OF THE
ORIGINAL PAGE IS POOR
Business at Dulles has been increasing as the charts indicate.
The growth rate recently surpassed both that of Washington National
and Baltimore's Friendship Airport. Still, the Washington Post reported
in December of 1974 that Dulles lost 4.9 million dollars in fiscal year
I
1973, while National earned 5.2 million dollars.
Airport authorities still maintain that the cost of building Dulles
will be recovered within the promised thirty year period. And they very
well may meet that schedule despite Dulles' disappointing economic per-
formance to date. It seems that the landing fees at Dulles are supported
by the booming business at Washington National. Since both airports are
managed for the FAA by the Washington Airport Authority, the Authority
has constructed the landing fee schedule so that it is considerably higher
than need be charged at National, considering its revenue/cost ratio,
and is much lower than would otherwise be charged at Dulles with its
cost/revenue imbalance.
Clearly Dulles, too, suffers from excess capacity, certainly not
mitigated by its considerable investment in symbolism, as well as functional
needs. For example, the terminal building cost about $100 per square foot
to construct, making it an expensive edifice by any standard. Office
buildings typically range from $25 to $35 per square foot, and public monu-
ments run in the neighborhood of $50 per square foot. This, then, adds
to the financial imbalance demonstrated by Dulles.
. o
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CHAPTER FIVE
Montreal: Experiment at Mirabel
E
Montreal International Airport (Mirabel)* is an interesting case,
particularly so in that one wonders whether more than twenty years'
design and operating experience in the United States had any effect on
this Cauadian project. The answer is, at least in part, yes. At Mirabel,
the design group adopted a basic concept pioneered at Dulles. That is,
they chose to divide landside from airside operations, connecting them
by mobile lounges. The new Montreal facility also was like Dulles in
that it was funded, designed, and constructed under the aegis of the
national government.
Yet Montreal is different from our other cases, including Dulles,
in several intriguing respects. The lands encompassing the airport were
expropriated by the Canadian government; it was the largest such acquisi-
tion in Canadian history. The airport facility itself rests on a respectable
17,000 acre site, but the government assumed control over more than 75,000
adjoining acres. Thus, Mirabel's 93,000 acre package is an order of mag-
nitude larger than most regional airports. 1 The peripheral 76,000 acres
*Our visit to Mirabel was in August, 1975, three months before it opened.
1
Except for about 253 residents of the area all land acquisitions have
been settled. It is this group that has vigorously protested and demon-
strated against the opening of Mirabel. The protests have pressured the
government in 0ttowa to grant an extra ten percent to all area property
owners (The Gazette, July 31, 1975; Le Jour, August ll, 1975). Demonstra-
tors attempted to halt the official opening ceremonies of Mirabel; they
were repelled by tear gas (The Dallas Mornin_ News, October 4, 1975).
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is intended to buffer residents from noise and other airport related
pollution and to protect the airport from unsightly, unplanned develop-
2
ment.
In the immediate vicinity of the airport only four villages remain
with a total populution of 6,000. Around the territory the development
of Mirabel and other related activities will definitely enhance the
social concentration of the area. If the projections are close to the
mark, the five next closest communities with a combined population of
1_2,500 (in 1971) will double by 1986 (Airport Peripheral Laud, Informa-
tion Service, October 197_, p. 27).
Transport Minister Jean Merchand admitted that too much land had
been expropriated and that the government is "quite ready to resell part
of the Mirabel lands it owns" (Province, March l, 1975, p. 2). The
initial costs of building Mirabel were set at $200 million dollars,
but at completion it had cost more than $_2_ million. Most of the excess
costs were borne by the federal government (The Gazette, May 2, 1975).
An interviewee indicated that the Ministry of Transport (MOT) anticipated
recovering the cost in twenty-five years.
2
For specifics on the zoning bylaws see Ministry of Transport, New Montreal
International Airport Zoning Bylaws, Numbers la, 2a, 3a, ha, _.--d-Sa,
Revised, August-December, 1972. Also, Toward a New Definition of Ecology
fo__Krth_._eeNe.__EwMontrealInternational Airpqrt, by Pierre Dansereau, 1973.
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It seems, then, that the Canadians concluded, perhaps from others'
operating experiences, that previously existing regional facilities were
not large enough to significantly reduce the nuisance factors. However,
one important nuisance factor that Montreal could not eliminate because
of its immense size was accessibility. In fact, in view of the constant,
spreading density patterns which characterize most urban centers, it seems
a likely hypothesis that accessibility and size will be directly and in-
versely related. Thus, it is not surprising that Mirabel is the most
remote of the regional airports studied. It is thirty-five miles from
Montreal, and rail, road, and public transit service to the airport is
far from good.
Another nuisance factor is that the Canadians have completely divided
the domestic and international traffic in the Montreal area; Mirabel will
process only arriving and departing international flights. 3 A less strict
division between Washington National Airport and Dulles has been responsible
for complaint and conflict between the airlines, the FAA, Congress, and
the user public. It will be interesting to see if similar conflicts
develop in response to this dichotomy at Montreal.
In sum, while it is too soon to tell whether the policy and design
choices at Montreal will enable it to escape some of the difficulties that
3
Service from Mirabel will be to Europe, Mexico, the Caribbean, and South
and Central America.
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have persisted in other regional airport designs. It is flexible like
Dulles, though not as symbolically intense. National governmental
control obviates the sometimes crippling consequences of regional
conflict. However, inaccessibility, together with rigid air route
division, will become a serious problem for any wishing to transfer
between domestic and international flights. The point is, in a project
of the regional airports' scope, because of interactive effects resulting
in inverse relationships, it may be that problems cannot be effectively
minimized; they can only be traded off.
Plannin_, Design and Construction
Although construction of Mirabel was to be a joint federal and
provincial venture, the ultimate decisions regarding the design, fabrlca-
tloM, and finally the operations, were made by Ottawa and the Ministry of
Transport (MOT). It was the MOT that launched a study in 1966 to examine
what measures should be taken to alleviate the expected saturation at
Dorval, (Montreal's International Airport before Mirabel) in the late
1970's. This same study indicated that the terminals at Dorval would reach
saturation levels in 197_. 4 At that time, the cost of purchasing land in
order to expand Dorval was prohibitive, and in addition, massive legal
4
In 1973 Dorval recorded 7._ million passengers. The traffic volume had
increased by 200 percent from the previous decade.
57
wfights over the noise pollution from Dorval had begun. 5 A cost-benefit
analysis was conducted by MOT that indicated it was more feasible to
build a new airport and restrict Dorval to about four million passengers
annually than to expand Dorval. Several interviewees indicated that
future plans now anticipate closing Dorval. Whether it will, in fact,
be closed depends largely on the economic vitality of the commercial air
indus tries.
w
w
Site Selection
A site selection study was launched by the MOT and some thirty
possible locations were investigated. Several of the sites located to
the south and east of Montreal were rejected because it would be very
costly to build bridges over the St. La_rence River. Furthermore, the
agrlbultural lands in the south were too valuable and expensive to pur-
chase for an airport site. 6 Ultimately, the Ste-Scholastique site (which
is now Mirabel) was selected by Ottawa. The factors that made this site
attractive were: it was an economically depressed area; it had marginal
farming communities; land was cheap; and, in the end, Ottawa hoped to re-
vitalize this region northwest of Montreal. 7 Lastly, air space at this
5
Legal battles over noise pollution still threaten to close Dorval. See
News and Chronicle, July 24, 1975, p. 2.
6
The provincial government recommended a site at Drummandville, north of
Montreal. The recommendation was rejected by Ottawa.
7
A total of $120 million dollars has been paid in claims to the residents
of this area.
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proposed site was the best; that is, approach and deparbure routes did
not overfly United States territory.
On the other hand, the disadvantages of the Mirabel site, situated
as it is thirty-five miles northwest of Montreal, were poor rail con-
nections, rapid transit services, and freeways 8 (see Illustration I).
The ministerial planning group, known as the New Montreal Inter-
national Airport Project Office (BANAIM), began work early in 1969.
Its mandate was to develop the airport master plan and to coordinate the
phasing, design, and construction activities. Direct implementation of
the master plan and the field work was contracted to International Airport
J
Consultants of Montreal (CAIM). BANAIM and CAIM were a mixed group
including specialists from the public and private sectors. The Ministry
of Transport retained veto power through all phases of Mirabel' s construction.
In our investigation no one group or set of individuals stands out. It
would appear that these consortiums combined experienced and inexperienced
personnel. No major schisms were evident among the groups, and the ulti-
mate declsion-making authority rested in Ottawa. If a conflict existed
8
The cost by taxicab from Mirabel to downtown Montreal is $30, while bus
service costs $3.50 and takes at least one to one and a half hours. A
feasibility study is under way to consider the possibility of constructing
a rapid transit system (TRRAMM) linking Montreal to Mirabel. For a de-
tailed study of this plan see TRRAMM, Department of Transport, Government
of Quebec, 1974. It is estimated that TRRAMM would cost $400 million
dollars (The Gazette, July I0, 1975).
59
, ,t
-+.
l
/
i
II
I
I
%
tCEBILITY OF TtIE
PAGE IS POOR
in
|
I
II
I
I
Ill
II
l
..+
I
O
3O
6O
$
t_
11.0
, Illustration I
0trays vo_ld ,weolTe the lnue and CAIM Vo_Lld implement the decLston. 9
mttr plan for MLr&bo1 emphuized operatin£ efficieucy and left
declaio_e open am lon£ u ])seeAble, in the event %echnologleu or needs
(Pa_son_rer TerQlnal _ __ S%_dtos. Nov Montreal
International Airport, _uno 1, 1971o I;P. 1o23).
The _e_lc planning l_iloeop_ eo_% to optinLtze the relationship
aaon4 four key airport varLablee: air o]_ace mna4e:entt rtmVa_lr cs_)acAty t
_und faollLttee (e._., passenger _put), and airport aooens.
"An optlm_ aix3x)rt development vould be achieved when the dm_oapactty
relationships _etveen the four variables are balanced at the point of
lowest cost and hi,best leml of service" (N_ntrea! L_ternati_sa_
Pz_Ject. ])epartmnt of Transport, 1970, p. 26).
Within these constralnta, +_n basle airport schemes _re developed,
and eevereS variations of each _esign _re conaiderede In the end desi_
8-D _ma chosen t_oause it prc_lmised more plannl_ f_exihility for lon_
range development (see Illustration II). IO
9
_Dae_c Province also cre_ted an org_uization called SA_RA (Planning
Service for the Airport Region), and it compiled an l_aot study of the
Ste-Scholaatique area. Overall Quebec Pr_vinoe had Linia_ input in
Mirabel decisions. Some Jurisdictional _0nf_Ict between Ottava and
_ebec did surface at the outset, vhich caused delay in the construction
phase of Mdrabel.
I0
For specific details of those plan_ see Montre___ Internatioual
Project, o_. cat., pp. _6-32.
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MIRABEL: FIELD LAYOUT
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The objectives specified in the design of the passenger terminal
included minimizing walking distances a_d service time, and providing
adequate space and equipment for rapid, simple operations, as well as
ll
ease of movement between operations. In optimizing the above character-
istics the remote gate concept (as used at Dulles International) was
thought to be the best design to fulfill these purposes. 12 Three features
of the remote gate concept were particularly attractive to the design group:
i) centralizing facilities into one building provided for:
- minimum repetition
- maximum revenue potential for concessions
- easy access to terminal and airline areas
- convenient location for mass transit
2) the apron passenger-transfer system offered:
- short walking distances; only 300 feet from the terminal entrance
to the people mover
- passenger traffic separation
- independent adaptability of airside and terminal building
- full gate interchangeability
3) the open apron concept allowed for:
- maximum adaptability of the apron
- flexibility in aircraft handling
- easy maintenance of the apron
- easy adaptability of the apron
- unrestricted visibility for apron control (Ibid., p. 7-29)
At conventional airports, aircraft that are parked adjacent to the
terminal are in essence physically connected to the facility by a leading
ll
For a detailed analysis see Passenger Terminal Concept Development
S}udies, oD. ci___t.,pp. 7-3 to 7-32.
12
Other terminal designs considered were those for Tampa, Dallas/Fort
Worth, Houston, Vancouver, and Toronto.
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bridge. When the aircraft is tied to the terminal, the walking distances
and terminal size are functions of the mumber of parked aircraft and
their wing span rather than the space needed for passenger processing.
If expansion is necessary (for aircraft parking or passenger processing)
it is generally necessary to expand both the apron and the building
simultaneously because of the linkage required between aircraft and
structure.
On the other hand, the detached gate concept provides flexibility
so that the apron or the terminal may be expanded independently. In
addition, the geometry of the terminal is primarily influenced by passenger
processing considerations if aircraft are physically removed from the
terminal, thereby providing flexibility for handling passengers and
Commonality among services exists at Mirabel; thus gates, departure
announcements, baggage, and so on, are controlled completely by airport
operations (see Illustration III).13 From the passengers' perspective,
the terminal design fosters simplicity and clarity. All passengers,
whether arriving or departing, will be processed in a straight line
13
There are a total of twenty-three airlines operating out of Mirabel.
Air Canada has the largest investment in space, equipment, and operations -
some forty percent of all activities. There are eighteen gates and six
additional gates for domestic flights at the Aeroquay. On the apron side
there are three airline service areas. Each area can service six air-
craft. The configuration will usually be four 747' s and two other
aircraft.
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Phase I
New Montreal Internalional Airport (YMX)
Mirabel, Quebec
Phase I
Nouvel adropor! international de Montrdal (YMX)
Mirabel, Quebec
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l i 1 1!
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wacross the building, with no changes in levels. The nominal walking
distance is about 300 feet.
The airlines have been quite dissatisfied with the design format of
Mirabel, primarily because it goes against the traditional grain of
airport operations. The airlines want to have complete control over all
aspects of their terminal operations. In the case of Mirabel, airport
operations or MOT makes all the decisions. Only in the ticketing area
will the airlines be free to exercise control.
Other Difficulties
There are, however, more specific criticisms of Mirabel. In particu-
lar, the airlines are concerned about the operation of the passenger
transfer vehicles (PTV, s). 14 With the exception of two PTV's, none of the
oth@rs have been tested in the inclement winter weather of Montreal. An
interviewee indicated that the PTV's "have not been proven as yet." Some
of the airport's managerial personnel will be familiar with the equipment,
but the PTV drivers will be drawn from the private sector. But_ according
to one interviewee, this will not preclude a crippling effect if the drivers
strike.
14
The airport opened with fourteen PTV, s and plans to acquire twenty-two by
1979. Each carries 150 passengers and costs $400,000. An additional
$50,000 was spent on each PTV to work out design defects. Two of these
PTV, s were used for about four years at Dorval in an attempt to anticipate
the kind of problems they will encounter in -40 ° F. weather and 120 inches
of snow. The airlines will compensate the airport for the use of the PTV
on a per trip basis, as they do at Dulles. Estimated costs are $300 per
trip, compared to $50 for using an airbridge at Dorval.
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wAnother gnawing PTV problem of concern to the airlines is that the
passengers under this system encounter an additional interface (incon-
venience) both in enplaning and deplaning. Also, special cases (ambulatory,
late arrivals, etc.) must be processed some other way, since the PTV is
incapable of handling such cases. One official interviewed was concerned
that the PTV's would require considerable maintenance, while repair turn-
around might be quite slow.
Another worry voiced by the airlines was that the de-icing pad would
not be operational until winter of 1978. Meanwhile, aircraft de-iclng
would be done by mobile trucks. This is not only a costlier process, but
also a time-consuming one that could create delays in flight operations.
Of all the airlines utilizing Mirabel, Air Cauada,s operations are
most affected. For the most part, Air Canada is the only airline that is
required to split its operations between Dorval and Mirabel. That is, all
international flights by Air Canada must originate and terminate at Mirabel.
All domestic flights and trans-border flights (to the United States) will
continue to operate out of Dorval. In 1985 the trans-border flights will
be transferred to Mirabel.15 However, there will be a few domestic flights
from Ottawa and Quebec City to Mirabel in an attempt to minimize transfer
passengers at Mirabel. These flights will utilize the Aeroquay, which has
six aircraft stands (see Illustration III). "Generally for the carriers,
which will have to operate from both Dorval and Mirabel, costs will increase
15
In 1973 traffic at Dorval was 55 percent domestic, 23 percent international,
and 22 percent trans-border. In the first year following the opening of
Mirabel, 5.2 million passengers are expected to use Dorval and 3.7 million a_e
expected at Mirabel. By 1985 forecasts for Mirabel are put at 17 million
passengers.
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by twenty-five to thirty-five percent." The Director of Properties and
Facilities for Air Canada, H. W. Torrell, indicated that "for Air Canada
alone, being at Mirabel will cost an extra two to four million dollars
annually" (Province, March l, 1975, p. 1).
Passengers arriving at Dorval from other parts of Canada or transfer
passengers from international flights will require at least two and a half
hours of lead time to make the necessary transfer connections.
Provisions have been made to accommodate STOL aircraft at Mirabel,
although a STOL port is not contemplated "until the need arises". It may
be that because Mirabel is so remote, STOL aircraft offer a viable alter-
native to surface movement of passengers, especially if the TRRAMM system
encounters further delays. 16
Noise generally has a serious disruptive effect on communities
adjacent to airports, to the extent that some have imposed curfews on
aircraft operations. The hope is that Mirabel is buffered sufficiently
to operate around the clock. In order to avoid the noise problem, fore-
casts were formulated for various years of Mirabel' s development. The
predictions were based on the FAA's noise exposure forecast units (NEF).
These are single value units which combine the effects of aircraft noise
w
m _
w
w
w
16
At present, the Ministry of Transport is in the process of developing
and evaluating a STOL commuter service between Ottawa and Montreal.
DeHavilland's Twin Otter (DHC-6 STOL) aircraft are being used for this
experiment. The STOL ports are located five and twelve minutes from down-
town Montreal and Ottawa, respectively. The DeHavilland Dash, which can
carry fifty people, will soon be put into operation. For details, see
Canada STOL Project; ADAC Canada, Ministry of Transport, 197_. Also Canada
_on,__, p--p--.2V_--Montreal Star_, February 8, 1975, pp.
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and daily flyover frequencies, measured in terms of decibels. Using
this formula, nuisance contour curves were developed. These noise fore-
casts will be updated annually as traffic patterns change or increase.
In addition, monitoring and surveillance systems have been installed. If
there is strict enforcement of the land use plan and continuous noise
monitoring, officials at Mirabel hope that complaints about noise will be
kept to a bare minimum. Part of the justification for Mirabel's location
can be attributed to BANAIM, s concern for noise pollution. When discussing
this problem with officials at Mirabel, it was evident that they were con-
cerned about public reaction. In most cases these same officials were most
reluctant to discuss the subject or to allow us to borrow documentation from
BANAIM's library on this topic.
Cu/Tent Operations , Problems and Prospects
Our discussion thus far has been focused on Phase I development at
Mirabel, which encompasses only one-third of the operational 17,000 acre
zone. Its future expansion will depend on the economic growth of the air
industry in the 1980's. "All options are open to us", according to an
interviewee, "as it pertains to what future terminals and other facilities
we will build." Unlimited flexibility would appear to be the by-word for
accommodating future needs, and this naturally depends to a large extent
on technical developments in the transportation and communications industries.
A truly international airport, Mirabel's public relations represents
it as "The Gateway to Canada" and the largest airport in the world. Such
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public relations phraseology is similar to that of D/FW's or Dulles's,
to name but two. Regardless of what image Mirabel projects, it is our
opinion that symbolically it does not really have the impact on the
community that D/FW has had. Both the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth
spent exorbitantly to foster this image. Montreal, to date, has not
done so.
Like D/FW, however, Mirabel is viewed as an economic multiplier for
the Montreal metropolitan area. Projections indicate that socio-economic
conditions for the area around Mirabel will be positive. The various
projects that will be precipitated by Mirabel (i,e., TRRAMM, new freeways,
etc.) will further help the economy of Montreal.
Overall, Nirabel is a fairly straightforward airport, utilizing very
few technically intense systems like Airtrans or Docutel. The PTV is
perhaps its most controversial element, but then even this system had
already been tested successfully at Dulles. What is completely different
and controversial at Mirabel is the role played by the airlines vi..__savis
the airport authority. Thus far the Ministry of Transport has had complete
control over all the decisions, and it has been relatively unfettered
because it is politically removed from local government contests, and
thus, the citizenry. This has given the MOT flexibility that other community
agencies ordinarily do not have in building their own airports. It remains
to be seen whether nationally-owned regional airports like Mirabel and
7O
Dulles will be the wave of the future for airport construction . . .
the jury is still out.
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CHAPTERSIX
T____: Different and Successful
w
Tampa International Airport (TIA) differs from other regional
commercial airports studied in this project. It handles less traffic,
and it is a nearly unqualified success.
TIA is located on the east shore of Old Tampa Bay, the western arm
of Tampa Bay. It serves a Florida gulf coast urban complex that includes
Tampa and Hillsborough County, St. Petersburg and Pinellas County, and
Pascc, Manatee and Sa_asota Counties, collectively called the Tampa
Bay Region. Like other Florida urban areas, the Tampa Bay region has
experienced rapid population growth since World War II, and continues to
grow. By 1970 the Tampa-St. Petersburg metropolitan area population
was just over one million, or about fifteen percent of Florida's total.
In the 1970's, and for the foreseeable future, TIA is proving successful
as a techno-system serving the growing regional demands for commercial
air travel.
TIA's success as a regional airport was not inevitable. Less than
fifteen years ago, airports at both Tampa and St. Petersburg were com-
peting for commercial airline service to the region, and neither had
terminal or runway facilities adequate for growing traffic. This chapter
traces the emergence of TIA in the 1970's as an innovative solution to the
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region's commercial airport needs. One section examines the socio-
political development of TIA. It focuses on the evolution of a re-
sillent and competent system of airport governance, political and
administrative, that could translate fiscal and technical resources
into a viable and adaptive system of airline service. The second
section bears on the evolution and implementation of TIA's new terminal
design. The final section reviews TIA,s current operations, problems
and prospects.
BackSTound: Tampa Becomes a Regional Air Center
Tampa and St. Petersburg are the dominant urban centers in the
Tampa Bay Region. Tampa, folded around the two northern arms of Tampa
Bay and spreading north and east, has historically been a center for
inddstry and shipping. Its essentially white middle-class character has
been tempered by a sizeable black minority and a long-established Cuban-
American community. Union labor is stronger in Tampa than in most southern
cities of equivalent size, and the politics of Tampa and surroundlngHills-
borough County have been Democratic, ranging from traditional to increasingly
liberal. To the west, St. Petersburg occupies the southern end of Pinellas
Peninsula, which separates Tampa Bay from the Gulf of Mexico. The city
and the numerous beach communities to the north are settled largely by
white middle-class retirees and employees of various businesses comprising
an active tourist industry. The politics of St. Petersburg and Pinellas
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County have been conservative Republican since the mid-1950' s.
Tampa Bay was the site of the first American commercial air flight,
a trip from St. Petersburg to Tampa in 1916. But commercial aviation
was a relatively minor activity here until the end of World War II.
The postwar development of Tampa's commercial aviation facility can be
divided into two periods. The first was one of rivalry with a com-
periwig air facility in St. Petersburg, a rivalry that lasted until
1961. The second period was one of transformation, in which TIA faced
its new problems as the principal commercial facility for the region.
During both periods, a key factor was the existence and survival of a
viable governing agency, able to provide and guide the development of
Tampa's aviation facilities.
Rivalr _ with St. Petersburg (1946-1961)- Since World War II, the
most consistent growth industries in the Tampa Bay Region have been re-
tirement-settlement and tourism. The principal beneficiaries of this
growth have been the communities in Pinellas County, between the Bay and
the Gulf, and in Manatee and Sarasota Counties, south of Tampa Bay.
Tampa has also benefited from tourism, but it has grown in other respects,
as well, and has retained its character as a center of industry and
commerce.
The present site of TIA has never been the sole location, actual or
potential, for commercial aviation in the region. Sarasota has long
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maintained a facility to serve the smaller cities south of Tampa Bay.
But Tampa's main rival for commercial trunk routes in the first decade
after the war was St. Petersburg - the only other city in the region
approaching Tampa's size, and one much better located for access to the
region's tourist attractions of nearby beaches and fishing. By the
mid-1950' s, St. Petersburg was bidding strongly to capture all or a
major share of the commercial traffic in the region.
In the 1930' s, Tampa had lost out to Miami when Pan American
decided on a base for its early seaplane-oriented operations. But Tampa
had developed its small commercial airport on Davis Island, near the
downtown area, and the city also owned a small facility at Drew Field, on
TIA's present site. The City of Tampa leased Drew Field for military use
during the war, but reacquired it, considerably enlarged in land and
facilities, in 1946. A year earlier a special act of the state legislature
created the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority (HCAA), and charged the
Authority with the operation and development of all publicly-owned air-
ports in the County. The City of Tampa then turned over custody and use
of the reacquired Drew Field to the new HCAA, The facility, renamed Tampa
International Airport, began operations as Tampa' s primary commercial
facility in the same year, with service offered by National and Eastern
Airlines.
HCAA proved a remarkably effective institution for the governance and
promotion of commercial aviation facilities. Its governing board is com-
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prised of the Mayor of Tampa (ex officio), one of the Hillsborough County
Commissioners (also ex officio), plus three members appointed by the
Governor of Florida. Until the early 1960' s the three gubernatorial
appointees were in fact nominated by the Tampa Roundtable, a civic council
whose members are heads and former heads of Tampa's principal civic
organizations. The law explicitly permitted, but did not mandate this
arrangement. From the beginning, then, the HCAA Board had good ties to
the community's political and business leadership. While that leadership
has never displayed dynamic ambition on a national or even statewide
scale, it nonetheless did encourage and support the HCAA Board's efforts
to expand and improve commercial aviation services at TIA.
By the mid-1950' s, some airlines serving the Tampa Bay Region began
exerting pressure for consolidating services at one regional airport.
Tampa and St. Petersburg, the obvious contenders, each had roughly half
the passenger business and half the major trunk lines. Tampa had opened
a new terminal in 1952, and was in the process of expanding that and its
runway facilities. St. Petersburg, in a major bid to become the sole
regional airport, started a seven to eight million dollar project to provide
a new terminal and improved runways. For reasons that are not entirely
clear, the tide of competition turned in Tampa's favor in the late 1950's,
as more and more major airlines opened services at its expanding terminal;
but St. Petersburg continued development of its airport in hopes of reversing
76
Lw
the trend. The issue was settled in April, 1961, when the FAA decided
that the regional commercial airport should be located in Hillsborough
County.
Politics, opportunity and accident all played roles in this con-
clusion to the Tampa-St. Petersburg rivalry. In terms of convenience
to users the contest was a stand-off. Located ten miles apart on
opposite sides of 01d Tampa Bay, the two airports were each about as
close to the center of user density as geography allowed. But Tampa and
the FAA had in mind the possibility of moving TIA some ten miles south,
to the tip of Palma Ceia Peninsula that separated Hillsborough and 01d
Tampa Bays. This was and is the site of MacDill Air Force Base, then
serving primarily as the home for a force of aging B-47 strategic
bombers. An early decision by McNamara's regime at the Defense Depart-
ment to speed the phase-out of the B-47, seemed to make MacDill available
for conversion to civilian use. But the same Democratic ties that gave
Hillsborough County an edge over Pinellas County also helped preserve
MacDill as an active military installation. Hence TIA stayed in place,
adapting its existing site to expanding operations.
Coping With the Air Travel Boom (1958-1972)- In 1958, having captured
much of the region's commercial traffic for TIA, the HCAA Board also set
about finding new planning and managerial leadership. Its first important
decision was the choice of a new director to be the Authority's chief
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administrator. In this choice, the HCAABoard probably had the
benefit of advice from Leigh Fisher. Since World War II, Fisher had
built Leigh Fisher Associates, Inc., of San Francisco (LFA) as a major
national airport consulting firm. Fisher had done business previously
with Tampa, and he knew well a large number of the emerging profeesionals
in airport management. The Board's choice as new director was Herbert
C. Godfrey, Jr,, then manager of San Diego's Lindbergh Field. When
Godfrey arrived in Tampa in December of 1958, he announced his intention
to develop and improve TIA in accordance with plans suggested by Fisher.
Godfrey spent over seven years in Tampa, and was the central public
figure in planning for the development of a new terminal and other
facilities at TIA.
Godfrey first set about a series of minor changes to the existing
terminal, closing the area between its two sections, and moving and im-
proving the baggage facilities. Simultaneously, he and the HCAABoard
began to consider the possibility of a much larger terminal, to be located
near the center of the airport tract between the two main north-south
runways. Godfrey negotiated a consulting contract with LFA in mid-1962,
to study requirements for the new terminal; and ten months later, in 1963,
Fisher presented his preliminary report to the HCAA Board. Godfrey and
Fisher tentatively sold the Board on the goal of incorporating radically
new concepts into the terminal design, and persuaded the Board to give them
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more time. A full design team was assembled, including Fisher and LFA;
the J. E. Greiner Company of Baltimore and Tampa, consulting e_ineers;
H. Leslie Walker and Associates of Tampa, architects; Thomas M. Sullivan,
Port of New York Authority, architectural technical advisor; B. J. Vanlgen
and Company, Inc. of New York and Miami, fiscal advisors; and Herbert
Godfrey as coordinator.
What seems crucial in retrospect is that the HCAA Board did agree to
further planning. Passenger pressure on the existing facilities was
mounting, and indeed became nearly insufferable during peak periods in
the last years of the old terminal' s operation. What the Board had in
mind at the outset in 1962 was a fairly traditional new terminal, costing
twelve to thirteen million dollars. What the Board ultimately approved,
four years later, was construction of a new terminal according to the
Godfrey-Fisher design, to cost forty-two million dollars, and to open in
early 1969. Shortly after, in April of 1966, Godfrey resigned his post as
Director of HCAA, to accept a vice-presidency with United Airlines in New
York. (UAL has never operated in Tampa. )
By this time, the HCAA Board had undergone some significant changes.
In 1955, Clyde Perry, a Roundtable nominee with two years' service, was
elected chairman by the Board. In 1961, however, Democratic Governor Farris
Bryant decided to extend the patronage power of his office. Refusing local
advice from Tampa, he failed to reappoint Perry for a new Board term. None-
theless, the Board elected yet another old member and Roundtable nominee,
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Rudy Rodriguez, as its chairman. There was no more open interference in
the traditional appointment until Republican Claude Kirk succeeded
Bryant in 1967.
When Godfrey resigned, the HCAA Board turned to George Bean, who
had been picked two years earlier by Godfrey to be the HCAA airport's
manager. Bean had started with Northeast Airlines in 1947, aud then had
successfully managed airports in Worcester, Massachusetts, and Wilmington,
Delaware, before coming to Tampa. Bean carried TIA through the construction
and opening of the new terminal, and remains HCAA director today.
The new terminal did not open until April, 1971, about two years late.
In the interim, Bean and the HCAA Board faced and surmounted three major
threats to successful completion of the project.
One of these threats arose from Republican Governor Kirk's decision
to make gubernatorial appointments to the Board a matter of his patronage_
as his Democratic predecessor had done. While Kirk was in office (1967-1971)
the Board developed a marked party split; the Tampa Mayor and the Hills-
borough County Commissioner were traditional Democrats, while the three
citizen appointees were all Kirk Republicans. One aim of the Kirk men
was to uncover and expose what they charged was deep-rooted corruption
stemming from Democratic dominance of city and county government. Nothing
of any significance was discovered, but principal staff members and some
Board members were subjected to time-consuming and much-publicized outside
investigation. One staff member recalls that very little of any importance
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was decided by the Board during this time. Nonetheless, Bean suc-
ceeded, as had Godfrey before him, in gaining and maintaining the
Board's support for what was proving to be an increasingly costly
project.
The second threat arose from rapidly rising construction costs,
spurred by the Vietnam War inflation and compounded by a lengthy con-
struction workers' strike. Cost of the terminal and related improve-
ments, originally autherized at forty-two million dollars, rose to
eighty-one million dollars by the time the terminal opened. The greater
part of these funds were raised on revenue bonds. The HCAA chose not to
use its statutory taxing authority (one and a half mils); but it did
take the precaution of concluding a back-up agreement with Hillsborough
Com)ty and the City of Tampa to underwrite operational losses. One
current staff member recalls that the Board never balked at the rising
costs, during either planning or construction. They only insisted that
Godfrey, and Bean after him, stay within the financial consultants' ex-
panding revenue estimates.
A third threat came from the resident airlines, who made their own
contribution to rising costs. In a matter of weeks, just before ground-
breaking at the new terminal site, the airlines changed their position on
the new jumbo jets from "we'll never buy them," to "we'll buy them but
Tampa will never see them," to "we want the new TIA terminal to accommodate
them." This necessitated rapid and costly changes in the terminal's design
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which, nonetheless, were incorporated without eroding the integrity of
the Godfrey-Fisher concept. There wera other airline challenges, as
well, aimed at loosening the HCAA'sauthority over space assignment
and decoration and signing. Bean, with the Board's support, successfully
resisted these pressures.
w
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Planning, Design and Construction of a New Terminal
By the end of 1961, nine months after the FAA, s designation of TIA
as the principal commercial airport for the Tampa Ba_Region, annual
passenger volume (enplaned and deplaned) had reached one million, and
prospects were for continued growth. Planners at TIA had to consider
not only the growing traffic volume, but also some special passenger
characteristics. Traffic at TIA included an unusually large proportion
of _ged and infirm passengers, and seasonally it included a large propor-
tion of tourists, arriving for or departing from long stays with large
amounts of baggage.
The existing terminal, built in stages through the 1950's, was tucked
into the southeast corner of the airport tract, and offered limited
possibilities for further expansion. By 1962, the HCAA Board and manage-
ment were actively considering the idea of building a new terminal, to
be located near the center of the airport tract (between its two main
north-south runways).
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Under its consulting contract with TIA (1962-1963), Leigh Fisher
Associates reviewed not only the specific needs at Tampa, but also
the evolution of terminal designs nationwide. A digest of their
report, prepared in late 1963, offers insights into their general
findings and the direction that the new TIA terminal design was to
take.*
The LFA report argued that physical design of an airport terminal
complex must reconcile operational needs in three areas: airside
(aircraft loading and servicing), landside (roadways, parking, and
ground transport terminals), and a passenger collection point (passenger
processlngand services). Underlying the physical conflicts between
these needs are both technical constraints and the interests of three
parties to the terminal complex operations - the airlines, the airport
management, and the passengers.
In the past, the LFA report continued, design compromises had been
made primarily in favor of airside operations. Specifically, terminals
had been designed to accommodate the increasing space requirements of
larger and more numerous commercial aircraft; the airlines' desires to
*BaslcConcept - Landside/Airside Separation: Di__st of__._Eighteen
Month Investigation into Alternative Methods o__fAirline Airport Termina_
_Possibilities?-_e_Hi_ughCo__AviationAuthority
(Tampa, Florida), by Leigh Fisher Associates, Inc., Airport Consultants,
San Francisco, California, October, 1963. Persons principally responsible
for the report were: Herbert C. Godfrey, Jr., for HCAA; and Marjorie
Brink, Research Analyst; James C. Harrison, Planning Analyst; and Leigh
Fisher, Special Consultant and Director of Analysis for LFA (short
reference: LFARe___Digest, 1963).
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conduct competition on the basis of separate, distinctively identified
operational and passenger processing spaces; and the airport manage-
ment's desires to route passengers past revenue-returnlng concessions.
The result had been the evolution of airport terminal design toward
increasingly elaborate variations on the original linear terminal.
Landside facilities, in the absence of any spur from improved ground
transportation, had emphasized improved roadways and expanded parking
facilities. Relatively little attention had been given to the passengers,
convenience, in terms of location of parking, disposal and collection
of baggage, and intra-termlnal movement from landside to processing to
airside.
The report suggested two major areas of possible improvement in the
design of a new terminal for TIA. First, by separating landside and
airside facilities physically, it should be possible to design each to
its own operational and financial constraints. In particular, the
designs could take advantage of the much longer expected life of landside
technology, as compared to airside technologies responding to more rapidly
changing aircraft characteristics and needs. Second, the design should
take more fully into account the convenience of the passengers at all
points, from the entrance to the airport site to the aircraft gate.
The LFA report discussed various design features that might help to
achieve these improvements. While recognizing that passenger collection
could be physically combined with the airside facilities, most of the
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discussion emphasized a central facility combining laudside and
passenger collection operations. This would include ground transport
terminals, stacked automobile parking levels, passenger processing
facilities, concessions (possibly including a hotel), and airport offices.
Airside functions would be confined to several outlying structures of
simpler construction. Finally, in what the report recognized as the
major disadvantage to the scheme, some means would have to be incorporated
to transfer passengers, baggage and cargo between the laudside collection
terminal and the alrside facilities. Solving the passenger movement
problem indeed proved the greatest challenge for the design team assembled
in late 1963.
The design team was not certain that any innovative solution to
designing a new TIA airport terminal complex would eventually receive
HCAA's approval. Consequently, the team developed three different parallel
designs during the period 1963-1965:
l) a terminal in which passengers would depend upon the transfer
device for their travel between the central terminal cote and
the alrside satellites;
2) a modification of the conventional terminal layout, shortening
walking distances without the horizontal transfer device by
piling landslde activities on top of each other in a central
terminal structure;
3) the conventional terminal, with concourse/parking lot "sprawl"
and all.*
*Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, Tampa International Airport,
A New Approach to Jet AgeTerminal Development, PrcgressRe_ort,
_91_---1965, 1966-_sh-_t ref_ HCAA Progress _, 1961-1965).
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Staff members now recall, though, that Godfrey and Fisher strongly
favored the first, full-separation scheme, and that scheme was sub-
sequently approved by the HCAABoa_d in January, 1966.
Godfrey, we are told, insisted on three criteria for his favored
scheme: (1) that walking distance from parked car to aircraft be
held to a maximum of 500 feet; (2) that the transfer system operate on
straight-line routes; and (3) that the transfer system technolo_ybe as
fully demonstrated as _ossible prior to design adoption. As implemented,
the new terminal design somewhat exceeds the first criterion, with a
maximum walking distance of 645 feet from parking to alrside gate area.
This compares favorably with mlnimum distances at most regional airports.
The Second criterion heavily favored a final configuration of the separa-
tion scheme, in which each satellite airside structure is connected to
landside by a separate stralght-line transfer system. Meeting the last
criterion, that is, finding a well-developed transfer technology, offered
the greatest challenge to the design team.
In their search for a viable transfer system, beginning in 1963 the
design team considered at least sixteen different manufacturers. In
mid-1964 they toured several systems at the New York World's Fair aud
visited two separate Westinghouse facilities in Pittsburgh. They then
sent formal requests for proposals to three firms: Westinghouse Electric,
Westinghouse Air Brake, and Stephens-AdamsonManufacturing. Of these,
only Westinghouse Electric responded in full. This review process
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considered a wide variety of systems, ranging from roller and roller-
belt devices offered by Disney Enterprises and Stephens-Adamson, to
monorails, to rubber-tired cars moving or towed on a conventional
roadway, to the Westinghouse Electric system finally adopted, which
employs automated, rubber-tired cars operating on a guldeway.
Between approval by the HCAA Board and completion of the new
terminal, several important features of the design were altered. The
adopted plan called for auto parking on top of the airside structures
as well as at landside. As constructed, the terminal offers structural
parking only atop landslde. A proposed remote drive-ln, check-ln system
was omitted, and the alrside facilities were adapted to accommodate
jumbo jets.
After considerable construction delay, the new TIA terminal opened
in April, 1971. A brief tour with hypothetical departing and arriving
passengers will suggest the character of the terminal complex.
A departing passenger approaches the terminal complex from the south.
He can be dropped off by car, taxi or limousine at the passenger processing
(second) level of the landside terminal. Or he can park on one of three
levels atop landside and descend to level two by elevator. Or he can
turn in a rental car at ground level and take the elevator to passenger
processing. At level two, he may check his baggage outside the door,
or conduct ticketing and baggage business at a conventional airline
counter inside. (A staff member proudly notes that even long ticketing
L__
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counter lines seem less stressful to waiting passengers, as carpeting
throughout cuts down the interior noise..)
Checked in, and free of all but carry-on items, the passenger is
directed to an escalator leading up to level three. Here he will find
a full range of shops and restaurants, and truly comfortable lounge
areas clustered around television consoles. Or he may proceed directly
to the correct station at level three to board the transfer system.
For normal, automatic operations, the transfer system for each of
four airside terminals consists of two cars riding on parallel elevated
guideways. The passenger approaches through the landside entry lobby
located between the ends of the two guideways. The cars depart land-
side and airside simultaneously, and the trip takes forty seconds; so
there is little waiting time to board a car. Riders enter and leave
the cars from opposite sides, so there is no struggle with counter-traf-
fic. The cars have no interior seats, but ample rails and poles provide
safe support. An automated address system instructs riders on each
move.
At airslde, the passenger is funneled through inspection, and then
has a short walk and/or escalator ride to reach his gate. Here he is
back in familiar airport surroundings, with conventional lounge areas
and limited snack bar service available.
The arriving passenger has an equally short walk from the gate to
the transfer system. To accommodate peak arrival periods, the transfer
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system is designed to handle up to 840 riders per ten minutes in
either direction. Reaching landside, the arriving passenger easily
locates a two-story escalator (or stairs, or elevator) to take him
down to ground (first) level. Here he will find a conventional baggage
delivery system and access to ground transportation (or an elevator up
to the parking levels). The exit road connects to an interstate highway,
aud thence east into Tampa or west, across the Bay, to Pinellas County.
The terminal complex is not particularly striking from the outside,
but it is attractively landscaped. What amounts to aU above-ground
tunnel at the ground level passenger exit is relieved by fountains and
plantings. The interior decoration of landslde is interesting and in
some instances dramatic. The carpeting throughout the landside pedestrian
levels has proved remarkably durable, showing few signs of wear, spills
or cigarette burns. (Delta Airlines chose terrazzo over carpeting for
the airside it leased; the Delta station manager now wishes they had
chosen carpeting.) Throughout the terminal complex, successful efforts
were made to accommodate wheelchairs and reduce the strain on elderly
and infirm passengers; even the restrooms are separated from the landside
lobby by baffles rather than doors. In December of 1973 an airport hotel
and office building opened, which can be reached either from its own
ground entrance or by a passageway from the landside lounge (third)
level. The overall effect is one of comfort and ease, quite unlike
any other airport terminal we have seen.
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Passengers using the TIA terminal do confront three problems, one
continuing, the other two episodic. T_e contlnuingproblem is signing.
The lack of uniform direction signs at regional airports means that
probably no two passengers will react to the same system of signs in
quite the same way. Although the TIA design team contracted with a
special consultant, the original system had to be changed soon after the
terminal opened, and other changes have been made from time to time since.
The system is not particularly complicated; but signing seems to be an
art to which individual users react unpredictably.
A second problem, or set of problems, is associated with the transfer
system. It is possible to operate the cars manually, though this is
rarely necessary. It is also possible to reduce operations to one car
per leg. This is done frequently to conduct maintenance or repairs on
the second car, and it can have the effect of halving the carrying capacity
at unplanned times. More serious, though much less frequent, is that both
cars on a transfer leg may go out of service. The guideway structure in-
cludes a walkway that can be used in emergencies. But the most usual
cause of complete breakdown is an electrical storm; these occur with
exceptional frequency in the Tampa Bay area, and are usually accompanied
by very heavy rains. Under such circumstances, no amount of umbrellas
pressed into service can keep the walkers dry.
A third problem is the baggage service. Normally this is quite
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prompt, helped along by the dedicated (reserved) roadways routed
underneath the aircraft parking aprons. But in peak tourist periods,
the baggagehandling system can fall behind.
None of these problems, however, detracts from the traveller's usual
experience at TIA of efficiency, convenience and lack of strain.
Current Operations t Problems and Prospects
,i '
Most aircraft operations at TIA are conducted on the two north-south
runways (36R/18L, 8,300 feet, and 36L/18R, 8,700 feet). Landing and
take-off maneuvers to the north of these runways cause little noise
problem, as the area to the north is zoned for light industry. To the
south of the western runway (36L) is Old Tampa Bay. But operations to
the south of the eastern runway (36R) do impose noise pollution on a
fairly well-to-do bayshore residential area. Thus, landings and take-
offs on the eastern runway are normally limited to the northern approach.
When the western runway is out of service, though, as it was for recon-
struction during fall-winter, 1975-1976, some operations must be conducted
over the southern approach to the eastern runway. An extensive public
relations campaign served to hold complaints to a minimum.
TIA also has one east-west runway (9/27, 7,000 feet) south of the
terminal and crossing the eastern runway. To the west of that runway
again is Old Tampa Bay. But to the east is an older residential area
that is going increasingly commercial. Staff members recall that, after
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jets were introduced to TIA, some homeowners won awards under reverse
condemnation procedures.
In general, TIA causes little concern in the surrounding community
over noise or other forms of pollution. Roger Stewart, the vigorous
director of the Hillsborough County Environmental Protection Commission,
did object unsuccessfully to the recent acquisition of a professional
football team for Tampa Stadium, some two miles east of the airport.
He argued that the added automobil_ traffic in the area would danger-
ously _ucrease the periods of high air pollution. TIA got involved by
offering use of mome of its undeveloped parking areas for remote stadium
parking. Even so, Stewart did not see TIA as a serious source of opposi-
tion on pollution problems.
Aircraft operations, averaging about 280 per day, have not yet
seriously strained TIA's capacity for aircraft or passengers. Passenger
traffic has continued its steady climb, except for 197h-197_. Unlike
D/FW or St, Louis in the early stages of their airport controversies,
Tampa has somehow avoided excessively optimistic traffic forecasts. In
1963, Lelgh Fisher projected a traffic rise of 621,000 to 690,000 en-
planing passengers in 1966. Actual orlgin-and-destination traffic for
196_ was 1,81_,O00, about fifty percent greater %han the level projected
by Fisher. The chart below shows the growth and expected growth of TIA
traffic for 1961-1980.
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What is particularly striking is that actual 1975 traffic (March,
1975 to February, 1976) was only a little short of the projection for
1975 made in 1967, despite the impact of economic recession. HCAA staff
members add that the TIA terminal can handle up to twice the current
passenger traffic without major adaptations, although this would probably
exacerbate peak-period problems, Moreover, should traffic increases
justify the investment, the TIA terminal is designed to accommodate
two more airside facilities like the four already operating.
The recent repaying work on the western north-south runway was
necessary, HCAA staff says, because of unexpected deterioration since
the runway opened in 1963. HCAA, they point out, originally built a
thicker runway than FAA would then recommend and support. The repaired
runway is even thicker (sixteen inches), and new runway and approach
light-signalling systems have been added. Similar runway deterioration
problems have been experienced at other major airports, these officials
say.
In spite of its name, TIA has very little international traffic
(five flights each way weekly), and no two-way direct international
routes. Negotiations are currently underway to designate TIA as a co-
terminal to relieve the heavy international traffic burden at Miami's
overcrowded facilities. Community opposition in Miami to expanded or
relocated facilities there suggests that the negotiations may succeed.
w
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If so, Tampa will need better international airside facilities than
those now available to Pan American, which uses the one TIA passenger
gate that lack_ jetway access to airside. If the using airlines
would underwrite it, TIA would reserve a fifth airside for international
service; but the current financial difficulties of Pan American make
this seem unlikely in the near future.
Long-tlme Tampa residents have been slow to appreciate the achieve-
ment of HCAA and the TIA terminal design team. They tend to be more
surprised than gratified by the favorable reactions of visitors to the
area. There is no other public facility in the Tampa Bay Region that
even approaches the TIA terminal iD combining attractive design with
effective use. A local architect still expresses mock disbelief that
the architectural work was done by a Tampa firm. By and large, local
residents are just grateful that the terminal works and, thus far, does
not cost them tax money.
The closest to a critical view that we uncovered was offered by
Professor Harold Allen at the University of South Florida's College of
Business Administration. The Tampa business commun/ty, he says, is simply
not imaginative or ambitious enough to realize the full symbolic potential
of TIA. This was only partially confirmed by talks at the Greater Tampa
Chamber of Commerce, where TIA and its hotel are looked on as strong
assets. Still, we encountered no evidence of ambitious long-range schemes
for community and business growth focused on Tampa's advantages as a center
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wfor air and sea traffic - certainly nothing approaching the dreams in
Dallas and Fort Worth of becoming a great center for world trade, or
the early hopes in St. Louis that a new airport would spark rejuvenation
of a decaying urban core.
C0_c_us_n
TIA, with its new terminal, is a rarity for the 1970's - an
immediately and contlnulngly successful techno-system serving the
commercial air transportation needs of a large urban region, In asses-
sing its success, it is difficult to separate the factors of fortuitous
timing, shrewd planning, and stable institutions.
TIA needed a new terminal in the early 1960' s. Had a conventional
terminal been designed and built then, it would probably be adequate to
traffic demand now and for the foreseeable future. That the new terminal
was n,t plar_ued to open until 1969 (with construction delays putting off
actual opening to 1971) might indicate uncertainty and over-cautlon.
But the HCAA Board's willingness to support a lengthy design period An
order to pursue significant innovations suggests a different picture, that
of a governing institution willing to live with current physical and
technical inadequacies and willing to risk future failure on a large scale.
Leigh Fisher commented, after presenting his preliminary report to the
HCAA Board in March of 1963:
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It's the first time in all my ei@hteen years in the
consulting business that this has happened. Everybody
wants a terminal right now, maybe yesterday. They
define the problem and say "find the solution". Tampa
has in effect reversed that procedure and told me to
"define the problem" first. So, for the first time in
my experience, I haven't been told to build something
right now. I've been told to try to think this one out.
It' s extremely encouraging.*
Most importantly, the TIA tezminal's success stands as a tribute
to the design team, and especially to Leigh Fisher and Herbert Godfrey.
Both proved able to put to work their long experience in airport mauage-
men$. Both tempered imaginative vision with caution over new technology,
and, it would seem, with healthy skepticism about overly ambitious fore-
casts of traffic,
The present HCAA staff were all involved with the design and con-
struction of the new _erminal, They are proud of their success, but
are not planning any striking new departures for the futu_re. They also
recognize that such a project would be much more difficult to implement
now, given current trends in the economy, and given the recently developed
political and legal constraints on clearing new projects for environmental
impact. The current HCAA planner is not even certain that physical facill-
ties like TIA's will be viable or necessary in the longer run, given
possible developments in intra- and inter-clty ground transport. But such
developments lie in the still unforeseeable future. For now, the attitude
_Tribune, March II, 1963.
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of the HCAA Board and staff, and of the community they serve,
to be to enjoy what they have accomplished.
seems
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CHAPTER SEVEN
St_ Louis: Unresolved Conflict
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Lambert International Airport, located seven miles west-northwest
of downtown St. Louis in St. Louis County, is a small 1,800 acre airport
serving a metropolitan area with a population of 2.4 million. It is
generally agreed that Lambert Airport cannot serve indefinitely as the
principal commer0ia/ airport for the S$. Louis metropolitan area, but
there is intense controversy focusing on two questions.
First, how long can Lambert serve the commercial air transportation
needs of the St, Louis metropolitan area?
Second, what steps need to be taken now and by whom toward locating
and developing a new commercial airport for the azea?
Site Selection - Background of the Controvers [
Both of the above questions are subsumed in one policy decision now
sitting before the Secretary of Transportation. That decision is whether
to approve or disapprove a formal application for construction of a new
commercial air carrier airport for the St. Louis area, at a site between
Columbia and Waterloo, Illinois, some nineteenmiles south-southeast of
downtown St. Louis. How that application came to be made in early 1972,
and the fate of that application in St. Louis, the State of Missouri,
the State of Illinois, and Washington, D. C. during the election year
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of 1972, comprise the principal roots of the current controversy.
To understand the origins of the application for a new commercial
airport for St. Louis on the Illinois side of the river, one must first
understand something of the political demography of the St. Louis
metropolitau area. The 1970 census shows a population for the St. Louis
standard metropolitan area of about 2.4 million people. Of these, only
twenty-five percent live in the city of St. Louis, itself. Another
forty percent live in S_. Louis County. An additional ten percent llve
in three more Missouri counties surroundin_ St. Louis County. And the
final twenty-five percent live in two Illinois counties on the east side
of the Mississippi River. Population trends over the past twenty years
show St. Louis County (excluding the city), and the three additional
Missouri counties, as the principal population growth areas in the metro-
s
politan area.
In the past twenty years the City of St. Louis has gone the way of
many other core cities in the nation's metropolitan areas. That is, the
population is increasingly black and poor_ The problems this raises for
city governments and finances are exacerbated by the special state charter
for the City of St. Louis given in the late nineteenth century, which
completely separates the City of St. Louis from St. Louis County, and in
the opinion of some political and legal historians, gives the city charter
a standing in state law equal to that of the state's own constitution.
This effectively prevents the city from expanding its tax base by annexation.
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Party politics in the city of St. Louis have been solidly Democratic
for decades. In St. Louis County and the other three outlying Missouri
counties, party politics have more closely reflected the border state
competitiveness in the State of Missouri in general, while elections in
the small cities and towns of those counties have been technically non-
partisan, Although down-state Illinois is traditionally Republican,
politics in the two Illinois counties of the St. Louis metropolitan area
show some greater degree of competitiveness. East St. Louis, the major
city on the Illinois side, has the apparently deserved reputation of being
an unrelieved urban slum, where political power is contested between
corrupt conservative white Democrats and black Democratic politicians.
Lambert International Airport, although locater in St. Louis County,
is owned and operated by the City of St. Louis. By 1968 the
conventional wisdom among airport experts and airport users in the area
was that the life of Lambert was definitely limited, probably to 1980,
or at most, 1985. The then mayor of St. Louis, A. J. Cervantes, ap-
parently agreed with this conclusion, but he must also have concluded
that construction of any new airport on the Missouri side of the river
could only _k_rther stimulate the growth of the St. Louis metropolitan
area to the west and southwest, away from the core of the city. From
Cervmutes's point of view, then, both the City of St. Louis and the
State of Illinois should have a mutual interest in assuring that any new
lOl
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airport for the St. Louis metropolitan area be located on the Illinois
side of the river.
Two events in 1968 reflect this mutual interest. In Nay the Illinois
state legislature appropriated $50,000 to fund a site selection study
for a new airport in the St. Louis region; and in November the City of
St. Louis voters approved a revenue bond issue including $100 million
dollars for improving Lambert airport and $70 million dollars to start a
new airport.
In 1969 the City of St. Louis authorized an engineering firm to
conduct an airport site survey for the city. The results of the survey
were completed in August of that year, but were not released at that
time.
The first official public expression of the joint effort toward a
new airport by the City of St. Louis and the State of Illinois came in
April of 1970. At a news conference on April 22, Mayor Cervantes and
the Republican Governor of Illinois, Richard Ogilvie, announced their
joint intent to create a single airport authority to construct and
operate a new commercial air carrier airport on the Illinois side.
Their plan, which they said had informal approval of the federal authori-
ties and the airlines, was to construct the airport, to move all air
carrier operations from Lambert to the new airport when the latter opened,
and then to deed Lambert to the new authority for development as a general
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aviation airport. Although no specific site for the new airport was
announced at that time, the plan gained quick acceptance from the
two major St. Louis newspapers, the _ Democrat and the P_ Dispatch,
and endorsement from the local council of governments, the East-West
Gateway Coordinating Council.
Governor 0gilvie and the Illinois state legislature acted quickly
in the summer of 1970 to create the St. Louis Metropolitan Area Airport
Authority (hereafter called the Illinois Airport Authority), and appro-
priate 1.5 million dollars for the Authority. From the outset, the
Authority has consisted of five members appointed by the Governor of
Illinois, with the first appointments made in August, 1970. The legis-
lation also allows for the appointment of an equal number of members
from the Missouri side, but only at such time as the new airport comes
into operation and the Authority takes control over Lambert airport.
The Illinois Airport Authority held its first meeting in October, 1970,
and by the end of the year had authorized a final site selection
engineering study and had appointed its executive director, Mr. Arven
Saunders.
In February, 1971, the City of St. Louis released its 1969 site
selection study, which suggested, among other possibilities, that "a
site at Columbia and Waterloo in Illinois be given consideration for
location of the new St. Louis airport". In May, the Illinois Airport
Authority announced the results of its own site selection study, which
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indicated a clear preference for the Columbia-Waterloo site, and the
Authority formally applied to the Federal Aviation Administration for
air space clearance over that proposed site. In June, the State of
Illinois committed 15million dollars of a 900 million dollar trans-
portation bond proposal specifically for land acquisition at the
Columbia-Waterloo site. In August the Illinois Authorityheld public
hearings on the Illinois side, and it held similar hearings on the
Missouri side in October. In January, 1972, the Illinois Authority
filed formal application for federal airport aid with the Federal Aviation
Administration.
Opposition to the Illinois Airport Authority's plan for a new air-
port at the Columbia-Waterloo site developed slowly in 1971. In March
the Missouri state Division of Commerce and Industrial Development com-
missioned a study to look for alternative sites on the Missouri side.
The results, published in August, indicated that two sites, one west
and the other northwest of St. Louis, compared favorably to the Columbia-
Waterloo site and would be closer to the users. In April, 1971, a group
of Illinois residents in and around the proposed Columbia-Waterloo site
formed an organization called HUSTLE (Help Us Save the Land and Environ-
ment) to fight the location of the new airport in their community. And
in October, 1971, the McDonald-Douglas Corporation, whose home head-
quarters is located on the edge of Lambert Field, released its own
in-house report, showing ways to get additional air traffic capacity
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out of Lambert Field. But it was not until 1972 that concerted oppo-
sition to the Illinois Airport Authority's plans developed.
By early 1972, two opposition points of view were gaining increasing,
though hardly majority, support. First, there was growing skepticism
on the part of a number of parties about the forecasts of aircraft
traffic and passenger traffic on which the Columbla-Waterloo plan was
being developed. These forecasts suggested that commercial air traffic
in and out of the St. Louis region would grow about eight to ten-fold
between 1970 and 1995. Second, there was increasing concern among a
variety of persons and groups on the Missouri side about the economic
implications of building and operating a new airport on the Illinois
side of the river. In direct terms, there was concern not only about
the loss of airport jobs from Lambert to an Illinois airport, but also
about the opportunity costs to Missouri contractors and construction
unions if the airport were built by Illinois contractors and construction
unions. In indirect terms, there was growing disenchantment with the
idea of refocusing and reshaping the growth of the St. Louis metropolitan
area simply by putting its principal airport on the Illinois side.
These and other opposition points of view gained institutional ex-
pression in February, 1972, when Democratic Governor Hearnes of Missouri
signed two new pieces of legislation. The first created a Missouri-St.
Louis Metropolitan Airport Authority (hereafter called the Missouri
Airport Authority), and required that all plans by any public body in
lO5
Missouri for new airport facilities be approved by this new state
authority. The second bill authorized a referendum the following
November among citizens of St. Louis, St. Louis County, and the three
surroundin_Missouri counties in which voters would express their
preference between the following two statements:
l) I favor the use of Lambert St. Louis International Airport so
long as possible and the construction of a new facility in
Missouri; or
2) I favor the immediate construction of an area airport facility
in the State of Illinois to serve the airline users in the
greater St. Louis metropolitan area.
The intent of these two pieces of legislation was clearly to aid re-
tention of the principal St. Louis airport on the Missouri side of the
river. Whether by intent or default, however, no formal proposal has
ever been made to replace Lambert airport with a new commercial air
carrier airport on the Missouri side of the river. Instead, the strate_
of opponents to the Columbia-Waterloo plan has been to focus attention
on the possibility of improving Lambert airport so as to keep it viable
past 1985 and, its partisans argue, even past 1995. Whether by design
or not, opponents of the Columbia-Waterloo plan have been able to main-
tain a common front by focusing on prospects at Lambert and avoiding
the possible divisiveness of disputes over one or another specific alter-
native sites in Missouri.
The Missouri Airport Authority met for the first time in March, 1972.
On hand were the members authorized to be appointed by Governor Hearnes,
L_
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but none of the members which the legislation entitled the _Vm_vorof St.
Louis to appoint. The main product of the Missouri Airport Authority
during 1972 was the Lambert-2000 expansion plan, made public in October.
Lambert-2000 called for a land expansion of Lambert Airport to allow for
the construction of a second major east-west runway, and argued that
this and other major improvements would keep Lambert viable well past
1995.
Opponents of the Columbia-Waterloo site gained public support for
their position well ahead of publication of the Lambert-2000 plan. The
St. Louis Globe-Democrat reversed its editorial support and began to
promote preservation of Lambert airport. Numerous candidates for public
office on the Missouri side, previously favorable to Columbia-Waterloo
or uncommitted, spoke out in favor of a Missouri solution. HUSTLE con-
tinued its operation on the Illinois side. In May, the Missouri Authority,
St. Louis County, and the State of Missouri filed legal notice of opposi-
tion to any favorable decision on the Illinois Authority's application
with Transportation Secretary Volpe.
Nonetheless, several factors favored the Illinois Airport Authority
and its Columbia-Waterloo plan. Foremost among these probably was the
conventional wisdom, still widespread in the St. Louis area, that Lambert
airport could not last forever and indeed would cease to be viable within
the plannable future. As important, at least for the short term, were
the early start that the Illinois Airport Authority had in developing
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plans for a new airport and the continued support through appropriations
by the Illinois state legislature and Governor Ogilvie. Only slightly
less important were the continuing public evidences of support by
Federal Aviation Administrator John Schafer, and the apparent assumption
within FAA that what St. Louis needed was a large commercial airport on
the model of the one then being built at Dallas/Fort Worth. This FAA
support was probably also strengthened by the confidence the agency
would have in Arven Saunders, executive director of the Illinois Airport
Authority, who was an old FAAmanhimself.
Despite these strengths, proponents of the Columbia-Waterloo plan
could not get a favorable decision out of the Department of Trausportation
during 1972. This non-decision rested largely on political, rather than
technical grounds. For one thing, Republican Governor Ogilvie, while
campaigning for re-electlon, told a small meeting of supporters on the
Illinois side of the St. Louis area that his plans for a new airport would
in effect steal the airport and its jobs and its economic returns from
Missouri and bring them to the Illinois side. Publicity given these remarks
on the Missouri side served as a rallying point for opponents of Columbia-
Waterloo and mayhave contributed considerably to the overwhelming vote
in the Novemberreferendum in favor of Lambert and a Missouri solution
to St. Louis's airport needs. According to Saunders, however, sometime
in late summeror early fall of 1972, and well before the Missouri referendum,
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the Illinois Airport Authority' s application had reached Secretary
Volpe' s desk, ready for his signature with all of the necessary depart-
mental clearances. And Volpe probably would have signed it, Saunders
maintains, but for a decision made in the White House. That decision
had little or nothing to do with St. Louis's airport needs, but a great
deal to do with the hopes of the Nixon White House for adding a Republican
governor in Missouri to its list of 1972 victories. Republican Governor
0gilvie in Illinois, so the reasoning seemed to be, was in no trouble
at all, and he didn't need help from the Nixon administration in the form
of immediate approval of the Illinois airport. So, the argument went,
why should the administration make trouble for a potentially successful
Republican candidate in Missouri by approving the Illinois plan? As it
turned out the White House was only half right. Governor Ogilvie lost to
Democrat Dan Walker in Illinois, but Christopher Bond did defeat Warren
Hearnes, and Missouri got its first Republican governor in quite a long
time. In the meantime, though, the Columbia-Waterloo plan was shoved
well to the back of the burner in the Department of Transportation.
In early 1973 the St. Louis Airport Authority, which controls
Lambert airport, released the results of an engineering study showing
that the Lambert-2000 expansion plan was not feasible. A little later
in the year the president of McDonald Aircraft Corporation suggested that
any significant expansion of Lambert airport' s land area might force him
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to move his operations out of St. Louis. And in March the Federal
Aviation Administration released an interim report favoring the Columbia-
Waterloo site over others that had been studied, including the Lambert-
2000 plan. Thus, the Missouri Airport Authority's first thrust toward
a Missouri solution died within six months of its publication. But the
idea of a Missouri solution did not die, and indeed gained new strength
in 1973.
Much of this new strength stemmed from the St. Louis mayoral election
in the spring of 1973. Mayor Cervantes, who had been an original party
to the Illinois proposal, was replaced as Democratic candidate for mayor
by John Poelker, who expressed doubts at several points during his
campaign about the desirability of an Illinois airport. Almost immediately
upon his election in April, Mayor Poelker ordered the St. Louis Airport
Authority to cooperate with the Missouri Airport Authority in developing
a master plan for Lambert airport. Shortly thereafter he formally with-
drew the support of the City of St. Louis for the Illinois Airport
Authority and its plan.
The remainder of 1973 and much of 1974 brought further maneuvering
among the City of St. Louis Airport Authority, the Missouri and Illinois
Airport Authorities, the airlines, city and state officials and con-
gressional representatives on both sides of the river, the Federal Aviation
Administration, and the Transportation Secretary's office. The principal
fruits of this maneuvering were delay and two additional proposed studies
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to be added to an already impressive collection of studies and proposals
regarding airport needs in the St. Louis area. One study grew out of
Transportation Secretary Brinegar's decision to review air traffic fore-
casts for the St. Louis region, a task he assigned to the consulting
firm of Peat, Marwlck, and Mitchell (PMM). At about the same time, the
St. Louis Airport Authority, the _issouri Airport Authority, and the
FAA reached agreement, with the reluctant concurrence of the Illinois
Airport Authority, on a decision to conduct a full scale master plan
for Lambert International Airport. The contract for this study was
awarded to the Ralph M. Parsons Company. As the Parsons master plan
study has gone forward, the Secretary of Transportation has continued
to consult with Peat, Narwick, and Mitchell on a succession of issues
regarding St. Louis airport needs.
Issues Currentl_ in Dispute
The primary coordinator for the Lambert master plan is Mr. Ron
Moore, who was hired from the Missouri Airport Authority by Mayor John
Poelker after his election in March, 1974, and appointed acting Director
of Planning and Engineering at Lambert. Moore, an engineer, had worked
for the State of Missouri, but had not worked on airports before 1972.
The master plan study was divided into four phases: (1) phase A, aviation
traffic forecast; (2) phase B, evaluation of alternative development
plans for Lambert; (3) phase C, layout plan; and (4) phase D, financial
IIi
!W
w
w
_J
5_
E 52
= -,
plan. The FAA initially approved funding only for phases A and B.
These were completed in early 1975 and the _AA then gave the go-ahead
for the rest of the study. Although the report on the first two phases
is in the public domain, copies were not available for collection in
ou_ archives. Nonetheless, we were able to gather sufficient documents
and other information through interviews to help us identify the prin-
cipal technical, socio-economic, and political issues currently in
dispute.
Technical Issues - One major result of the Parsons study for the
Lambert master plan and the PMM study for the Secretary of Transportation
has been a significant reduction in the air traffic forecasts for 198_
and 199% in the St. Louis area. The initial forecasts by the Illinois
Airport Authority showed a ten-fold increase in air traffic between 1970
and 1995. Current forecasts by both Parsons and PMM now suggest only a
four-fold expansion in commercial air traffic during this period. These
much-reduced traffic forecasts have probably played as important a role
as did political maneuvering in prolonging the decision by the Secretary
of Transportation on the Illinois Airport Authority's application for the
Columbia-Waterloo site. It should be noted, though, that it was only
as a consequeuce of earlier political maneuvering in 1971 and 1972 that
an earlier delay on this decision was achieved, which permitted the sub-
sequent re-exploration and reduction of air traffic forecasts.
While there is geueral agreement by all parties to the dispute on
t_
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these reduced air traffic forecasts, nonetheless distinct and conflicting
Nissouri and Illinois positions have developed on three more technical
issues regarding Lambert International Airport and its future. The
Missouri points of view _re expressed in the Parsons Company work on
phases A and B of the Lambert master plan. The Illinois points of view
have been expressed in the work of Arven Sauuders and his associates in
the Illinois Airport Authority, as they and their various consultants
have tracked the Lambert master plan point by point. Both Moore at Lambert
Airport and Saunders at the Illinois Authority seemed optimistic that the
PMM studies for the Secretary of Transportation would support their
particular and conflicting points of view.
At the technical level conflict focuses on three basic issues re-
garding the adequacy of Lambert International Airport over the next
twenty years. First, can the highways northwest of St. Louis handle the
growing airport and non-airport traffic in the area? Second, can the
runways at Lambert be re-designed and can new air traffic control tech-
nology be installed in time to handle three to four times the present
air traffic? And third, will airport noise levels rise so far as to
require extensive and expensive land condemnation procedures around
Lambert Airport? The Parsons master plan study suggests optimistically
that all of these problems can be solved to keep Lambert viable through
1995. Saunders at the Illinois Authority feels that the PMM studies have
raised serious questions on all three counts, and he insists that Lambert
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cannot meet St. Louis's needs past 1985. RonMoore, speaking as an
interested party but also as a relative newcomer to these technical
questions, suggested twice in our conversations that answers to these
three problems depend less on technical engineering analysis than on
whether the respondent favors or opposes keeping Lambert open for the
next twenty years or more.
Additional technical problems involving air space conflicts and
new site preparation costs are not currently at issue in the Parsons
and PMM studies. Nonetheless, they will come to the fore when and if
it is decided that Lambert must be replaced as the principal commercial
airport in St. Louis. The air space problem arises out of the common
desire on all sides to retain Lambert as a general aviation facility
should the commercial air carriers move to a new airport. Early in the
controversy two sites were identified as possible Missouri alternatives
to Lambert Airport, one at Darden and one at Smartt Field. From the
point of view of land cost and distance from users, either of these sites
would be competitive with Columbia-Waterloo. However, the Illinois
Authority and John Schafer at FAA have both contended that a major airport
at either of these sites would conflict with the air space necesaary for
extensive general aviation operations at Lambert. RonMoore contests this
view, arguing that the air space conflict problem is no more serious than
that raised at, for example, Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, where two major
runways parallel to each other are operated simultaneously. The FAA's
position on this is probably responsible for the Nissourl Authority's
early decision not to propose a specific alternative site on the Missouri
side, for fear that the FAA would reject Darden or Smartt out of hand.
Although a number of other Missouri sites have been looked into at one
time or another over the past five years, the Missouri Authority seems
to have given serious consideration to only one more - this one at
Cedar Hills, southwest of St. Louis, about as far from the center of
passenger origin as would be Columbia-Waterloo to the southeast. The
major shortcoming of Cedar Hill lies in its topography and geology,
which would entail much higher site preparation costs than would
Columbia-Waterloo. These considerations suggest that there are some
grounds, although far from definitive, for Arven Saunders' contention
that a Missouri solution to St. Louis's airport needs would result
in building a new airport some forty to fifty miles west of the city of
St. Louis.
The issues of highway access, air traffic capacity, and noise are
the most pressing technical issues now facing Secretary of Transportation
Coleman in his need to make a decision on the Illinois Airport Authority's
application. But the problems of air space conflict and site preparation
costs lead inevitably to some socio-economic issues that the Parsons and
PMM technical studies cannot resolve.
Socio-Economic Issues - Socio-economic issues in the current controversy
are not as easy to define and outline as are the technical ones. In past
r
decades the growth of St. Louis as a major commercial, industrial, and
transportation center has taken place west of the river. Many elements
in the business community and the community at large would be content
to see growth continue in this direction. On the other hand, there are
those elements who argue that the proper future for St. Louis lies in
regional development involving communities on both sides of the river,
and in revitalizing the City of St. Louis as the true center of the
region. Relocation of air carrier facilities from Lambert to some other
site might well have some effect on the future direction and character
of St. Louis's growth. But just what and how extensive that effect
would be does _ot seem answerable. The original agreement between Mayor
Cervantes and Governor 0gilvie was ostensibly based on the regional view
and on the argument that an Illinois solution would contribute to the
revitalization of the City of St. Louis. Mayor Poelker's formal with-
drawal from that agreement has left the Illinois Airport Authority,
Illinois officials, and the St. Louis Post Dispatch as the Principal
public proponents of that point of view. Opponents of Columbia-Waterloo
contend, on the other hand, that the future of the City of St. Louis
depends much less on relocating its primary airport in Illinois than
it does on the general quality, character, and unity of downtown lea_er-
ship. This general issue and many specific related aspects of it were
reviewed in detail in summer and fall of 197_ by a special Airport Issue
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Committee created by the Regional Commerce sad Growth Association (a
recent regional replacement for what was the Greater St. Louis Chamber
of Commerce). Members of this committee were selected from among the
few prominent individuals in the St. Louis communities on both sides
of the river who had not publicly committed themselves on either side
of the airport dispute (see section on current developments below).
Political and Governmental Issues - Whether Transportation Secretary
Coleman approves or disapproves the Illinois Authority's application
for an airport at Columbia-Waterloo, there will remain a number of
political and governmental problems to be resolved.
It is possible that Secretary Coleman will conclude that Lambert
airport can be kept viable through 199%. If so, there would seem to be
no reason to approve any application for a new airport at this time.
The Illinois Authority and others have argued that even if a new airport
is not built until after 198%, now is the time to select a site.
Various proposals have been made for land-banking at the Columbia-Waterloo
site, and there is a wide variety of pressures for this kind of a solution.
Nevertheless, the FAA and the Department of Transportation have indicated
that their interpretation of the statutes precludes any federal involve-
ment in land-bauking. While it is unlikely that the land at the Columbia-
Waterloo site will remain available for an airport indefinitely, any
decision to reserve that site for future use a decade or two hence will
ll7
require some new institutional solution between the states of Missouri
and Illinois or other relevant authorities, one having stronger legal
and political status as a regional institution than that now enjoyed
by Illinois's St. Louis Metropolitan Area Airport Authority.
Finally, even if Secretary Coleman does approve the Illinois Airport
Authority's application for an airport at Columbia-Waterloo, it seems
highly doubtful that the Illinois Authority could maintain its claim to
status as the regional airport authority. Although Mayor Cervantes
claimed he had the authority under his city charter to enter into an
agreement with the State of Illinois, the subsequent enactment of the
Missouri Airport Law and later moves by Mayor John Poelker both point to
the need for a new institutional solution, possibly involving an inter-
state compact, to govern future commercial and general aviation facili-
ties in the St. Louis region.
Current Developments - Two important developments since our visit to
St. Louis in August, 1975, reinforce the thrust of the preceding analysis
and suggest that the interested parties are about to pass from the stage
of intense controversy to one of partial but substantive progress toward
meeting the community's airport needs.
In November, 1975, the special Airport Issue Committee of the Regional
Commerce and Growth Association made public its findings and recommendations.
The Committee trod carefully between the _Missouri and Illinois position,
and recommended that:
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l) steps be taken immediately by the City of St. Louis, its
Airport Authority, the airlines and the FAA to speed improvements
at Lambert, with a view to keeping that airport viable for at
least another fifteen years;
2) the FAA designate Columbia-Waterloo as the site of a new
regional airport, without specifying any date for its development;
3) the State of Illinois undertake land-banking of the Columbia-
Waterloo site, but postpone further master planninguntil the time
for using the site is clearly in view;
4) the State of Illinois and the State of Missouri undertake needed
changes in the powers and makeup of the existing Bi-State Develop-
ment Agency, and, in cooperation with the City of St. Louis,
• take steps toward transferring jurisdiction over all airport
operations, planning and development in the St. Louis area to
that agency.
The Committee's report pleased few of the principals to the controversy,
possibly the mark of a successful compromise in the making. Moreover,
the Committee admitted that the Bi-State Development Agency, although
created some years ago by interstate compact and in possession of authority
to operate airports, is not currently strong enough or representative
enough to take on the recommended tasks. Nevertheless, the Committee felt
that it would be far easier to alter an existing compact than to achieve
a new one.
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In January, 1976, Transportation Secretary Coleman presided over
a one-day public hearing in St. Louis, and promised a written decision
within ninety days.
Conclusion
The controversy over a new airport for St. Louis affords interesting
parallels and contrasts with experience at D/FW and at other regional
airports.
Unlike our other cases, both St. Louis and D/FW exhibit intense
public political conflict involving independent governmental units. At
D/FW the controversy was resolved, at least for a time, when the FAA
induced the cities of Dallas and Port Worth to pursue a joint solution
to their common regional airport needs. The two cities reached formal
agreement on a site and created the D/FW Regional Airport Board to plan,
finance, build and operate a facility on that site. At St. Louis, however,
a planning institution was created by one state, Illinois; the Illinois
Authority then selected a site and developed a proposal. That, in turn,
spurred creation of a Missouri Authority and revived interest in lengthening
the life of St. Lottls's existing Lambert airport. The political dispute,
ostensibly between Missouri and Illinois, has also divided the Missouri
side of the greater St. Louis community. Quite aside from the relative
technical and economic merits of the MiSsouri and Illinois cases, the
crucial fact is that no viable institution has yet emerged that can respond
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authoritatively to the region's long-term airport needs.
Whenand if such an institution is created, it may be able to
avoid manyof the problems now confronting the B/FWAirport Board.
Both the long political dispute and the closely concurrent economic
recession have led to extensive and conservative _eassessmentof airport
needs in St. Louis, and all parties are aware of the difficulties that
have plagued D/FW.
If no such institution comesinto being to mark current resolution
of the controversy, the likely consequencewill be a rather half-hearted
attempt to extend the useful life of Lambert Airport. The controversy
would probably be resumedopenly in another decade, by which time the
alternatives available might be even less attractive than at present.
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CHAPTER EIGRT
Conclusions
It must be clear from the preceding chapters that we found con-
siderable variation among the regional airports we studied. Topo-
graphical settings, locations within the region, architecture, and
technical support features differ widely. Yet the wide expanses that
buffer them territorially from other activities in their regions, and
the drama of their physical presences, tend to wash out perceptions
of difference. They seem more of a piece th_ any one of them compared
to a near city airdrome. They have more than technical purpose in
common. They seem responsive to common public and elite urges. They
are clearly techno-systems of the same species and of the same generation.
The regional airports appear similar because the regional airport
concept is a manifestation of basic assumptions widely shared among those
who have been actively developing them. Indeed, the same individuals
appear in the development of several of the airports studied, and the
design group for each airport project assiduously studied the design
features of preceding airports. These studies ended in a choice of
one or the other of two basic schemes: (1) a terminal cluster between
parallel main runways, such as at Kansas City International and D/FW;
or (2) a single landside terminal providing transport for passengers
to airside aprons or docks, as produced at Dulles, Montreal and Tampa.
122
Moreover, these airports face commondifficulties that are more than
simple, direct consequencesof comparable technical design. All are
attempts to cope, somemore successfully than others, with complicated
problems that inter-relate and reinforce one another in ways that are
not well understood even by the actors involved. These actors in
regional airport development, design, construction and operation are
driven, it seems, by their values and training and by social necessity,
toward a basic optimism- an optimism founded in confidence that they
can surely control and ultimately defeat periodic difficulties. Poli-
tical officials, airport administrators, architects, design engineers,
and _irline executives all encounter unerpected, surprising consequences
of their decisions, consequencesoften arising from optimism that is
rather weakly founded on anunderstauding of social, political, economic
and technical inter-relationships. Not surprisingly, they are capable
of molding the future in the direction of their expectations, but their
success is frequently episodic and rarely meets the demandingrequire-
ments of their expectations.
Two sets of needs and expectations underlie the drive to develop a
regional airport. Oneis the desire, originally promoted by the commercial
airlines and the FAA, to consolidate operations at a single facility
within the region. Consolidation is sought by individual airlines because
they seek to reduce overhead costs. Consolidation is advancedby the FAA
and the airlines collectively, as they all endeavor to constrain interline
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competition for passengers. The other side of the development d_ive is
the desire for regional economic growth and advantage. The regional
airport cause is taken up by community elites seeking not only direct
but multiplier effects on business growth and development in their
respective areas.
Consolidating commercial airline services requires heavy regional
capital investment. In the eyes of those promoting the regional airport,
this investment is more than justified by the expectation that the uew
facility will more than repay its cost. Consolidation will, they believe,
improve the technical efficiency and financial well-belng of the airlines
themselves. And greater airline efficiency, coupled with attractive,
up-to-date facilities, should inevitably attract even more passengers
and, of course, more revenues. More than that, the new modern airport
is to become a vibrant symbol of the community's present economic well-
being and serve as a gateway to the region and its bright future prospects.
The drive toward airport consolidation requires regional support.
Not all those involved in such a drive, and even less all the other
affected regional groups and interests, share the same goals and values.
Conflicts arise, both in selecting the site and in financing the new
facility. Proponents of development, confident in their anticipation
of high returns, seek to attract support and confound opposition by the
very logic of their case - logic usually founded in optimism about growth
and excitement over the symbolic, prestige-enhancing qualities of the
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proposed facility. Thus the need for support and the desire for
technical-physical-symbolic attractiveness combine to push the various
actors in a commondirection, namely toward a modern, exciting, dramatic,
technically-intense regional air facility.
In the sections below, we review both the similarities and the
distinguishing characteristics of the regional airports we studied,
the decision processes that led to them, and the consequencesof those
decisions. The first section reviews the site selection process.
Although details vary from region to region, in almost every case that
process generated open and latent conflicts, and these in turn affected
the design and execution of the airport project. The second section
accesses the successive decisions involved in designing, building and
operating the new facility, and analyzes the varying patterns of out-
comes. In both of these sub-processes, it seemsclear to us that there
was very little to retard, and much to promote, the fundamental decision
to produce a dramatic, innovative, technically-intense system.
Selecting the Site
Once the drive to consolidate regional commercial airline facilities
begins, selecting the site might seem to its supporters to be a compli-
cated but solvable problem in rational policy analysis. The solution
would seem to require trade-offs among the capital costs of the laud
and of highways and utility lines connecting the airport to the surrounding
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region, convenient access for air passengers and airport and airline
personnel, air and ground safety constraints, nuisance and pollution
impacts on the immediate vicinity, and indirect localized impacts on
economic growth. Rarely, however, can the regional airport's supporters
turn to a single decision unit empowered to settle these compromises
according to its own or its immediate constituents' preferences. In
one fashion or another, site selection decisions reflect the varying
interests of airline executives, airport managers and governors, suppliers
of ground transportation, landowners and realty investors, local govern-
ments and civic groups, potential contractors and construction unions,
other major businesses and unions, potential or organized consumer and
environmental groups, and governmental agencies whose responsibilities
extend beyond the region. It is hardly surprising that the problem
of site selection seldom yields to a single or dominant "best" solution.
Nor is it surprising that site selection decisions often leave even the
most intense and continuing interests - those of the airlines, the
_anagement, and the passengers - unsatisfied in substantial ways.
Consolidation of Airline Service
The regional airport is most often originally inspired by the airlines'
desires to consolidate their operations at a single point. Such anexample
is clearest at Kansas City, Tampa, and St. Louis, where the consolidation
of commercial trunk lines has been or will be complete soon.
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Each of the other cases, however, offer an interesting and in-
structive exception to the rule. At Dallas/Fort Worth, a new intra-
state carrier, Southwest Airlines, has thus far been able to avoid
the intraline agreement and carry on a successful operation from Dallas's
Love Field. So far, Southwest's resultant special advantage in the
competition for the Dallas intrastate passenger market, has been pro-
tected by its status as an intrastate line, out of reach of the FAA,
and by the fact that its major competitor, Texas International, is one
of the smaller, weaker partners to the agreement consolidating trunk
service at D/FW. Indeed, the situation would hardly be worth noticing
were it not for the burden that D/FW's marginal revenue circumstance
places on its using airlines. A more important exception is apparent
at Dulles, which is not truly a regional airport in the sense heretofore
discussed. That is, Dulles competes with both Washington National Air-
port and Baltimore's Friendship Airport in serving the Washington, D. C.
region. Given Washington National's great advantage in passenger con-
venience, the only forces supporting extensive multiline use of Dulles
are the FAA and its Washington Airport Authority, both of which are
backed by federal governmental powers. The third exception, Montreal,
reflects the power of extra-regional governmental authority in a dif-
ferent way. Here the Canadian Ministry of Transport has required the
major line serving the region, Air Canada, to split its service between
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convenient, close-in Dorval and the new regional site, Mirabel.
All the airports we studied are intended to serve technical needs
in a metropolitan region. But those technical needs arise first
from the desires on the part of the airlines and the FAA to consolidate
air service. The region's need for a regional airport is, in this
sense, thrust upon it from outside. The subsequent motivations of
regional interest toward promoting or frustrating the establishment of
a regional airport all stem from attempts to cope with this extra-
regionally-inspired technical change.
Accessibilit_
The thrust toward consolidation and control of interline competition
does not, of course, point readily to ar_y particular site for the re-
giohal airport, but it does have the significant effect of dsmpening
the pressure to locate it near the center of passenger population.
This downgrading of passenger convenience is apparent to some extent
in each of the oases investigated. At D/FW considerations of passenger
access, taken alone, would have placed the airport much closer to Dallas,
rather than midway between the two cities. At Kansas City, the airport
is located nineteen miles north of the downtown area, whereas the majority
of users on both sides of the state line live south of the city's central
districts. At Dulles, the Chantilly location was a poor third choice
from the point of view of passenger convenience. At Montreal, the Mirabel
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site is a long thirty-five miles from the city. At Tampa, a Pinellas
County location would have better served a majority of users. At
St. Louis, only the pressure of political controversy has delayed
moving from a temporarily adequate airport that is very near the center
of user population, to a new site twenty-one miles south; and continued
controversy may yet result in a future regional airport even farther
from the users.
Not surprisingly, siting regional airports some distance from their
users results in higher costs in terms of ground access and, in some
instances, in continuing difficulties with providing adequate public
transport to the from the airport. The latter results are especially
apparent in the continuing troubles with the Surtran limousine service
to D/FW, and in the seemingly inevitable and unending disputes over taxi
service and prices at all the airports. In no case, however, with the
possible exception of Mirabel, have these problems been severe enough
to inspire creation or extension of rapid transit service to the airports.
That, and the failure of VTOL/STOL services connecting Dulles with other
intra-regional air centers, suggests that quick technological fixes to
the problems of access will not be readily forthcoming.
Land Availability and Cost
Land prices are a major factor in the relative capital costs of
alternative airport sites. In at least two cases, however, it was possible
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to treat this as a sunk cost, which led in turn to an obviously dominant
solution. At Kansas City, land at Platte City had been purchased to
subsidize TWA,s maintenance operations more than a decade before the
new regional airport was sited there. At Tampa, the wartime lease of
Drew Field to the Army resulted in a postwar windfall to the City of
Tampa in the form of a much expanded airport tract. In both cases,
then, land for a regional airport was effectively "free", at least
from the standpoint of those making the decision. At D/FW, by contrast,
a similar opportunity to locate the regional airport at existing Carter
Field was not seized, in large part because that site symbolized the
bitterness of earlier inter-city battles over a regional airport.
Factors other than the direct cost of the land, of course enter into
calculations of the capital costs of an airport site. These include,
most importantly, the geology and topography of the site, which can have
significant effects on construction costs, as well as the quality of
highway, water, sewage, and power systems in the vicinity of the site.
For example, the existence of an alternative site at Kansas City, five
miles from downtown, seems to have been discounted due to its location
on river bottom land and its likely need for additional flood protection
measures. The added capital costs of utility connections at Dulles,
occasioned by its great distance from densely occupied centers, led to
later efforts to share those costs and facilities with nearby small
13o
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communities. And the cost of building and reserving a special access
highway for Dulles remains a bone of contention in that region. At
Montreal, the great distance to Mirabel has raised the possibility of
future investment in a ground access system as costly as the airport
itself. At St. Louis, one alternative site on the Missouri side has
consistently been discounted because its topography and geology would
require unusually expensive site preparation.
Safety, Nuisance, and Pollution Constraints
One safety constraint that has had a significant impact on regional
airport siting is the FAA, s rules on "air space". The rules seem fairly
clear: an airport's air space normally is defined by a box centered on
the main runways and extending horizontally five miles in each direction
and _vertically to infinity. Any overlap between this space and that of
another airport must be the object of special agreement between the
concerned airports over vertical control of aircraft entering the overlap.
The general position of the FAA is that even small overlaps are Ito be
avoided. Among the cases we have studied, this constraint has played
an obvious role at St. Louis, limiting consideration of otherwise con-
tending Missouri sites that happen to have air space conflicts with already
existing airports.
Clearly the rules exacerbate the problem of avoiding conflict with
general aviation, military, and other air space claimants in the region.
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In a slightly different form, air space constraints also affected
the choice of Mirabel at Montreal. Here, alternative sites south of
the city were discounted not only because the river raised the costs
of access, but also because nearness to the Canadian-United States
border would necessitate speoial landing and take-off arrangements.
Topographic features, natural and man-made, in the vicinity of a
prospective site can offer threats to air safety, and hence constrain
site selection. In none of our cases, however, did these add signifi-
cantly to the problem of site selection, although ground safety risks
associated with nearby dense residential areas have played an important
role in several instances. At Tampa, residential density to the east
of the airport, and the feasibility of zoning restrictions to the north,
are factors favoring the north-south orientation of the main runways.
Similar problems played a reinforcing role in decisions to move away
from close-in airports in all our other cases.
Ground safety considerations have not been the only, or even the
most important, reason favoring moves away from residential areas. In
recent years increasing weight has been given to noise impacts in the
siting of airports. Consideration of noise has, in fact, imposed two
kinds of constraints on the location of regional airports. That is, in
all cases except Tampa, it has seemed desirable to move the airport some
distance from existing or probable future residential areas; and to hold
future noise impacts to a minimum, it has seemed further desirable to
w
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wconstrain future land use in the vicinity of the airport. In four
of our cases, the approach to such buffering has been to locate the
airport on a very large tract of land, which in turn has limited the
availability and raised the cost of alternative sites. This was an
important consideration, and added considerably to the capital cost
at Dallas/Fort Worth, at Dulles, and at Mirabel, and it affected
initial proposals for a Columbia-Waterloo site at St. Louis. More
recently, however, the costs such solutions impose have led local
officials to consider zoning restrictions as an alternative to owner-
ship in order to preserve a buffer against noise impacts.
In all cur cases except St. Louis, siting and construction of the
new regional facilities was accomplished before any formal requirement
for an environmental impact review was imposed. Our interviews did reveal
wide consensus, however, that these new legal requirements will impose
severe, perhaps prohibitive, constraints on any future re-sitin_ of
regional airports.
Although environmental considerations are increasingly important
for airport supporters and planners, organized opposition by residents
in the vicinity of a prospective airport has thus far vitally affected
the siting decision only in the case of Dulles. Here, citizen opposition
to the original preferred site at Burke gained slg_iflcant and effective
congressional support, forcing the FAA to abandon that alternative, despite
a sizeable initial investment. At St. Louis, a local group at Columbia-
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Waterloo formed to oppose an airport on that site; but perhaps because
it ran counter to unorganized, albeit intense, local interest in land
profits, this group seems to have played only a minor role in delaying
the St. Louis decision. At Mirabel, local residents' opposition developed
only after the fact. In general, it seems likely that residents in the
area of a prospective airport will have to ally with regional or extra-
regional environmental groups in order to protect their own vital
interests. Neither self-organization nor alliance is easy, given the
lightly populated character of most possible airport locations. However,
now that there are well established regional and national groups willing
to take up the environmental cause, local opposition before the fact
may become an increasingly important factor in future airport decisions.
Economic Growth
Like the thrust toward consolidation of airline service, considerations
of economic growth have played an important role in generating support
for new or improved regional air facilities. In all cases, with the
possible exception of Tampa, supporters have built their cases, at least
in part, on promises of general economic growth or recovery for the region.
This has been especially stressed at Dallas/Fort Worth, and to a slightly
lesser degree at Kansas City, Montreal, and St. Louis. Even at Tampa
the airport management has publicized some apparent impacts on community
economic growth. Moreover, insofar as these promises are associated with
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a much enlarged facility, they play at least an indirect role in
limiting the number and location of alternative sites.
In some cases prospects of economic growth have also been conceived
in specific intra-regional terms. The long battle between Dallas and
Fort Worth over location of a common facility was fired in large part
by competition between the two cities' business elites, and D/FW's
final location on the county boundary between the cities is a strong
symbol of the resolution of that conflict, a recognition that the airport
must at least appear to serve each city's ambitions equally. Similarly,
the long competition between St. Petersburg and Tampa was probably
fueled more by business community rivalries than by direct pressure
from prospective passengers for convenient access. At St. Louis, much
of the Missouri-Illinois conflict has been shaped by conflicting expecta-
tions and goals for downtown revitalization, reinforced by specific
conflicts between the interests of Missouri and Illinois-based con-
tractors and unions. At Montreal, part of the public strategy in selecting
the Mirabel site was to stress its potential contribution toward develop-
ing a section of the region marked by rural poverty.
Interestingly, we have uncovered no evidence that the new regional
airports have had any strong impact on either the respective regions'
comparative economic advantage visa vis other regions, or on specific
intra-regional patterns of growth.
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iSite Selection Controversies
The great diversity of values and interests affected by the selection
of a site for a regional airport makes some degree of conflict nearly
inevitable. An interesting question, then, is why such conflict did
not escalate to major public proportions in some of our cases. A
possible explanation may lie in the pre-existence of significant sunk
costs, economic or political, that helped pave the way to quick and/or
authoritative resolution.
At Kansas City, Dulles, Montreal, and Tampa, the institutional
focus for resolving any dispute was clear from the outset; but at Dulles
(although not at Montreal, the extra-regional character of the institution
probably facilitated opposition to the initial site selection. Kansas
City and Tampa also benefited significantly from prior investment in land,
and at Tampa, in facilities. Conflict has been most intense at Dallas/
Fort Worth and St. Louis. In neither of these cases was there any
generally accepted institutional path to resolving the controversy. In
St. Louis, at the outset proponents of a new airport heavily discounted
the value of sunk costs in Lambert' s laud and facilities. And at Dallas/
Fort Worth abandoning the sunk cost advantage of Carter Field was part of
the price of resolving the conflict.
Eveu where site selection conflict does not achieve high public
visibility, any one-time resolution of site selection is bound to leave
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one or more sets of interests relatively dissatisfied. The seeds are
sownfor the eruption of future site-related controversies. As the
planners-builders-operators face subsequent adversities - either those
arlsingnaturallyfrom the problems to be solved or from misadventure
or miscalculation - these seeds maygenerate still further difficulties.
Expectations of Regional Growth
As we have suggested, many local business elites, officials, ad-
ministrators, airline executives, and design teams have been filled
with heady optimism about the possible economic impacts of a large
regional air terminal. Most have been disappointed in their attempts
to find evidence to substantiate anticipated growth. Such impacts are
difficult to isolate, particularly in a large urban area. Those looking
for'alrport-engendered growth are often disillusioned, not so much because
regional airports do not have multiplier effects, but rather because it
is very difficult to measure exactly how the airport complex affects the
economic city - the standard metropolitan statistical area.
Thus, observers are inclined to concentrate on performance visa vis
projections of airport activity as an indicator of multiplier effect.
It is problematic whether airport performauce, compared with expectation,
is a valid indicator of developmental effect, but the fact remains that
in nearly all the cases studied, actual achievement lagged well behind
that promised.
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rThe Demand Forecastin_ Conundrum
The disjunction between promise and performance is more than merely
the avenue for disappointment; it also results in physical and technical
excesses, poor revenue to cost ratios, and subsequent political and ad-
ministrative difficulties. If it is implicated in so many of the troubles
experienced by those associated with design, construction, operation,
and support of the regional airport, why, then, does the ubiquitous
disjunction persist? There is no reason to expect that demand fore-
casting would lead to such pervasive difficulties. The trouble is that
the forecasting techniques employed were rather simple and could be
remarkably inaccurate, a fact that we found to be true in all but one
case studied.
The projections for growth at Tampa International, though slightly
optimistic, were considerably more accurate than those for the other
airports investigated. There appear to be several reasons for this:
sunk costs dampened the need for architectural drama and technical
excess (see the chart below) and the design group was not inclined or
pressured to justify an enormously costly new project by painting un-
realistic pictures of the growth at TIA.
We found so many different forecasters to be wrong - and in the same
direction - that it is not likely to be simply a manifestation of the
technique itself. If the projections did not cluster so consistently on
the high side of performance one might suspect that the cause was nothing
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more serious than faulty or unrealistic technique. Such is not the
case, however, and we suspect that the structure underlying consistently
optimistic projections is somewhat more complicated.
The cases we sketched in earlier chapters suggest the following hypo-
thetical sequeuce. The tendency for conflict (and in the case of D/FW,
Dulles, and St. Louis, bitter, long-lasting debate) leads the design
group toward a heavy investment in the symbolic aspect of a new airport
in order to make a statement that will build cross-cuttlng or unifying
support for the project. Similarly, even in the absence of protracted
conflict, the near-universal expectation that the airport will spu_
regional growth leads to technical and physical excesses, as the airport's
J
promoters seek, and seem to need, the dramatic impact which they believe
will attract activity.* This tendency to invest in symbolic purpose
is further fueled by the airlines who also support dramatic, often ex-
pensive accessories in order better to differentiate their products from
similar products marketed by others, and in this way attract a larger
share of the commercial air market. We found that the airlines are all
very coucerned that they be able to establish a unique identity in the
*We are using "excess" here in the context of that support capacity
necessary to comfortably and adequately perform the air to ground to
air transfer function. Thus, soaring glass-encrusted terminals,
chrome, carpets, colors, and computer-controlled people-movers, for
example, are embellishments on the basic theme; they go beyond meeting
the simple or actual needs.
t.-
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airports. They resisted passenger-oriented designs like those at Tampa,
Dulles, and Montreal because the separation of airside and landside
facilities does not permit an airline adequate opportunity to distinguish
itself sufficiently from its competitors.
In sum, then, we find that investment for largely symbolic purposes
may add considerably to a project that is already expensive in its
simplest form. Adding to high costs necessitates very optimistic growth
or demand forecasts to justify or "sell" the complete package, which then
the community elite and design group hope will "pull" the present toward
that projected future. Moreover, the drive toward unique structures and
dupport technologies can easily subdue lesser concerns, such as operating
convenience, passenger comfort, and so forth.
Thus, we are compelled to conclude that excess capacity in terms of
structure and technologies results in spite of flexible designs because
forecasting rssponds to the aforementioned "pull" of symbolic purpose.
This method is not likely to change until forecasts can be separated from
their present function - the justifying of large, dramatic, and expensive
construction. The day is approaching when analysts must begin to think
about the costs of symbolic purpose and discount accordingly, just as the
individual consumer must consider the extra cost and/or advantages of a
Cadillac over a Chevrolet. The increased cost of the Cadillac may be
worth the extra payment, but the wise consumer knows at least how much more
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he is paying, why he is paying it, and exactly what he can expect back
from this marginal increase in his investment.
Desi@a Decisions
In view of our analysis thus far, one well might ask just how much
choice is there in the design of those regional airports we studied?
Our research rather strongly suggests that in the broadest sense there
is very little choice, particularly in the decision to be dramatic
and innovative. The evidence indicates that the imperatives to archi-
tectural drama and technical intensity are more numerous and stronger
than those which would lead to different outcomes, imperatives such as
low capital costs, aaaptability, and simplicity, to name but a few.
This is not to say that there are not important differences among
the airport designs, differences which result in diverse experiences
for airport administrators, local officials, the airlines, and users.
We find that, though each design team was pressed to develop an im-
pressive facility, the character of a particular design group seemed
to correlate with variable technical responses to similar stimulae.
If the members of the design group were, for the most part, ex-
perienced, in-house professionals who Were personally connected to other
elites in the region and had learned to understand and operate effectively
in the area's political systems, the resultant design _eflected relatively
less concern for dramatic statement and more for the particular needs of
wthe region's users. Thus, in Tampa, for example, we found that the
facility was the least dramatic of the six; but the designers at TIA
had not relied on overly simple, optimistic projections of demand
growth, and as a result TIA had the best revenue/cost situation of any
facility studied. So too, TIA was among the most flexible, least
technically sophisticated designs and had experienced the fewest
operating problems. In sum, it appears that the backgrounds of the
people on the design team have considerable impact on the outcome, in
spite of strong pressures to adopt a maladaptive solution.
The second kind of group differs from the first in that it is a
new team, one not so experienced in the particular project at haud,
J
that is, the development of regional airports; but they do know and
understand the local political environment. Thus this group is legiti-
mate from the local point of view, but the members of the design team
feel pressure to prove themselves to the larger, relevant professional
communities. The result is frequently that the needs of the local
users are considered and fairly well served, as they are by the more
experienced group, but the need to make a dramatic, technically intense
facility, a need strongly reinforced by external dynamics, is emphasized
more by the inexperienced group. Under these conditions we find our
most creative examples, Dulles and Mirabel, which, though very dramatic,
are nevertheless quite flexible and well-attuned to passenger needs,
The dramatic facilities have their price, however. They are very costly,
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vand must be justified by optimistic growth forecasts, thereby virtually
assuring that actual reveuues will lag well behind expected returns.
The third case is the most painful in that it is maladaptive.
In this situation, we find an inexperienced deslg_ team that is not
established in the region's political systems and has not proven itself
technically. In response to the very real need to prove itself competent,
it most nearly approximates an organization serving strictly technical
objectives. If we may use a spatial analogy - the first two groups are
reasonably close to one another in their methodology, while groups in
the third category are rather distant from both of the first groups
i_ terms of their reinforcing effect on the scale, technical intensity,
J
and striking characteristics of the project.
The first two groups tend to emphasize user and operating needs
more than technical criteria, or at least emphasize them equally.
The third group commonly loses sight of user and operating objectives,
which become more and more displaced by technical criteria that logically
should be subordinate to such ends. Therefore, as a result of this goal
displacement process, the problems experienced by a facility designed
under group three conditions, are likely to be pervasive, many-faceted,
and of critical proportion.
In this category one finds the larger, more dramatic, most technically
sophisticated, least flexible, highest cost facilities. Revenue lag
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and passenger dissatisfaction may at times present overwhelming problems
for the airport administrators. Operating problems, which are often
costly to solve, add to revenue/cost imbalances and to widespread
feelings of dissatisfaction with a given facility.
We are only beginning to understand the interactive nature of the
policy making and design processes. Our research has strongly suggested
to us that these processes influence one another in ways that are not
well comprehended by the participants. These reciprocal relationships
have an impact on the shape of large, soclo-technlcal systems like
regional airports, and we have attempted to trace some of these impacts.
Furthermore, if the participants fail to recognize the dynamic nature
of the processes, and assume, for example, that they are simple, straight-
forward sets of problems, the consequences for both the technical and
political success of the project may be surprisingly unpleasant.
If both the policy makers and technical specialists better under-
stand their relationship to one another they can act to emphasize positive
interactions sad reduce the negative. Depending on local objectives,
officials can more intelligently recruit design groups and better recognize
what to expect of their product. We have "state of the art" technical
capacity for much better projections than those used by most of the design
groups for the airports investigated. Clearly, if local officials were
to insist on better forecasting techniques, many subsequent difficulties -
| f
inc!udin_unhappy revelations - would be mitigated or avoided altogether.
Still, it is well to remind ourselves that no projection, no matter how
sophisticated the technique, can be better than the assumptions which
underlie it.
We have argued that there tend to be, in the policy making and
designing dynamics, strong incentives to assiduously avoid the most
realistic forecasting possible. However, as many of our interviewees
noted, costs for regional airports are now sufficiently exorbitant
that the rewards for accuracy and realism are nearly as strong, perhaps
stronger, than the inducements to be overly optimistic in regard to
_2owth,
_ k
145
i= ,=
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
KANSAS CITY
Jack P. Avery, Burns and McDonnell Consulting Engineers
Ilus Davis, Attorney-at-Law and former Mayor of Kansas City, Missouri
Jim Fisher, Aviation Editor, Kansas City Star
Robert Hurst, City Development Department, Kansas City, Missouri
J. Hampton McDowell, Director of Transportation, Mid-America Regional
Council, Kansas City, Missouri
Brenton D. Myers, Assistant Director, Planning Development and Engineering,
Aviation Department, Kansas City, Missouri
R. Bruce Patty, AIA, Patty Berkebile Nelson, Architects
Sam Vaskov, Properties and Facilities Director, Trans-World Airlines
Frank Willoughby, Deputy Aviation Director, Kansas City International
Airport
DULLES
Lamar Guthrie, Chief of Airports Division for the Federal Aviation
Administration in the Department of Transportation
David Eess, Public Affairs Officer for the Federal Aviation Administration
in the Department of Transportation
John Kerr, Acting Manager, Dulles International Airport
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DULLES (Continued)
Ron Lewis, Assistant to Finauce Officer for Dulles International
Airport
David Saphalo, Assistant to the Manager, Dulles International Airport
James Wilding, Deputy Director, Washington Metropolitan Airport Service
Robert Arbique, Superintendent of Airport Operations (Mirabel)
Benoit Beribeau, General Manager, New Montreal International Airport
Project Office
Andre J. Bellemare, Director, Airport Operations and Services (Mirabel)
Dennis Boissy, Public Relations, New Montreal International Airport
Project Office
John Cyr, Marketing and Commercial Services (Mirabel)
Vic Davidson, Public Relations Director, Airtransit Canada (STOL)
Alex Demetrakis, Operations Office, Air Canada
Kubin Genzberg, General Manager (Mirabel)
Michael Kinnaird, Superintendent, Reception Services (Mirabel)
Jean La Riviere, New Montreal International Airport Project Office
R. E. Springett, Aerodromes Superintendent, BOAC
S. Stein, Architect, New Montreal International Airport Project Office
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TAMPA
Harold Alien, Professor of Business Administration, University of
South Florida
George J. Bean, Director, Hillsborough County Aviation Authority
EsccleBruck, Station Manager, Braniff International, TampaInternational
Airport
Charles T. Carey, District Manager, Eastern Airlines, TampaInternational
Airport
JamesC. Harrison, Assistant Vice President, Greiner Engineering
Sciences, Inc.
C. N. Jones, Jr., Station Manager, Delta Airlines, TampaInternational
Airport
Louise Lagette, Libr_riau, TampaTribune and Times
Paul T. MacAlester, Director of Information, Hillsborough County Aviation
Authority
Robert B. Magulre, Director of Planning and Development, Hillsborough
County Aviation Authority
John E. Probst, Director, Pan American World Airways, TampaInternational
Airport
JamesD. Seale, Chief, Air Traffic Control Tower, Federal Aviation
Administration, TampaInternational Airport
Roger Stewart, Director, Hillsborough County Environmental Protection
Commission
NormanH. Thompson,Jr., Executive Administrator, TampaBay Area Rapid
Transit Authority
Stephen Taylor, Chamberof Commerceof Greater Tampa
Jim Trezevant, Chairman, Hillsborough County Aviation Authority
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ST. LOUIS
James A. Dzierwa, Administrative Assistant, Missouri-St. Louis Metro-
politan Airport Authority
Ronald J. Moore, Assistant Director for Planning and Engineering,
St. Louis Airport Authority
Arven H. Saunders, Executive Director, St. Louis Metropolitan Area
Airport Authority
Gall L. Stubbs, Administrator, Missouri-St. Louis Metropolitan
Airport Authority
Thomas P. Walsh, Director for Transportation, Government Affairs and
Community Development, St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth
Association
SiraWilson, Director, Regional Forum, East-West Gateway Coordinating
Council
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